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OPINION PIECE

TAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Robert M. Ackerman*
Communitarians have suggested that a balance
must be struck between individual rights and the public
welfare, and that our self-seeking tendencies must sometimes be set aside in pursuit of the common good. Government is often (although not always) the mechanism through
which common interests are advanced. An abdication of
government responsibilitymay result in disaster,as was the
case with respect to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath.
At the other extreme, the accumulation of too much power
in government can also bring about catastrophic consequences, as in the case of the 1986 Chernobylnuclearplant
disaster in the Soviet Union. A balance must be struck
between the extremes of government passivity and "all
government, all the time. " Traditionally, this tension has
been framed as one of libertarianismversus collectivism; in
current American political parlance, that of liberalism
versus conservatism. But communitarians are more likely
to view these issues in terms of an adjustment of interests,
to be determined in the political arena, than as a clash of
rights, to be adjudicatedin the courtroom. This essay sug-

*Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania
State University; B.A., Colgate University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Kathryn Mason and Joel Samuels for their
invaluable research assistance. The author also wishes to thank Amitai
Etzioni, Hans Joas, Bodo von Greiff, Wolfgang Muller, and Wibren
van der Burg for their comments and encouragement. Earlier versions
of this essay appeared on the Communitarian Network webpage available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/WinnerofCommunitarianEssayContest.htm
and in German translation sub nom Verantwortung iibernehman,
2/2007 Leviathan 143.
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gests a communitarianframework for analyzing the boundaries ofgovernment power and responsibility.
Part I of the essay focuses on the Katrina disaster
and the abdication of government responsibility on the
local, state, and national levels both before and after the
hurricane.
Part II suggests the Chernobyl experience as a
counterpoint, cautioning us regarding the dangers of too
much government control.
Part III explores the underlying attitudes toward
government in the United States, suggesting that hostility
toward government has resulted in a "tragedy of the commons" that undermines the public welfare.
PartIV outlines a series of communitarianguidelines for principledconsiderationof the properrole of
government.
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DELUGE AND DELUSION.

Do you know what it means to miss New Orleans?1

On Monday, August 29, 2005, at 6:10 a.m. Central
Daylight Time, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of
the United States, with the center of the storm making landfall a few miles east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina
had been a Category 5 hurricane while in the Gulf.2 Its
intensity had diminished to Category 4 and then to a strong
Category 3 hurricane (with maximum sustained winds of
175 miles per hour) by the time it reached Louisiana and
Mississippi. 3 But Katrina's wind speed (the basis of its
numerical classification) told only part of the story. By any
measure, Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally large
storm. Hurricane-force winds extended about 100 statute
miles away from her center, and tropical storm-force winds
extended about 230 miles away. 4
The residents of the Gulf States had been warned
for several days about Katrina's imminent landfall, but it
was not until 10:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28, that New
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin saw fit to order the first-ever
mandatory evacuation of the city. As a consequence, when
the hurricane struck, "[a]pproximately one-fifth of New
Orleans's 460,000 residents were still in the city, and a
similar proportion were left in each of the surrounding
parishes (approximately 900,000 people lived in these suburbs)." 5 Katrina's winds caused some destruction (including tearing a hole in the roof of the Louisiana Superdome,
1 LOUIS ARMSTRONG, Do You KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO MIss NEW
ORLEANS? (Bluebird RCA 1946).
2 RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL REHURRICANE KATRINA 1 (Aug. 2005).
PORT:
3

id.

4 Id. at 1-4, 23-30.
5 DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA,
NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 89-90 (2006).
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where thousands of residents had taken shelter), but the
greatest devastation in New Orleans and elsewhere was a
consequence of the storm surge caused by the hurricane.
The Gulf of Mexico, Lake Pontchartrain, and a system of
rivers and connecting canals overflowed their banks and
breached the levees protecting New Orleans (much of
which lies below sea-level) and the surrounding communities from their waters. Low-lying neighborhoods in New
Orleans, the surrounding communities, and coastal areas in
Mississippi and Alabama were inundated and remained
underwater for several days. Thousands of citizens were
left stranded, or worse, drowned in the floodwaters. Their
desperation was exacerbated by what appeared to be an
utter breakdown of emergency rescue operations. State,
local, and national officials lacked organization, supplies
failed to reach their destinations, and public transportation
out of the city failed to materialize until several days after
the storm. New Orleans' predicament took on racial overtones, as a disproportionately large number of its stranded
residents were African-American. The loss of life, damage
to property, and overall devastation of New Orleans and
other parts of the Central Gulf Coast amounted to the worst
natural catastrophe in the history of the United States. The
tragedy painted a disturbing picture of disparity between
rich and poor, white and black, and a governing apparatus
that was too paralyzed to provide effective relief to beleaguered citizens.
The floodwaters had not receded before the fingerpointing began. Katrina was a natural disaster, but there
was a pervasive sense that the tragedy was unnecessarily
compounded by human failure. Hurricane Katrina would
raise anew questions about the role of government and
civic responsibility in America, issues of ongoing interest
to communitarians. The events surrounding Katrina suggested serious lapses in areas of official responsibility at
several junctures, both before and after the storm. A few
prominent examples are as follows:

15
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* Years of dredging by the United States Army Corps
of Engineers had kept the Mississippi River open
for shipping. It had also removed millions of tons
of silt necessary to replenish the wetlands of the
Mississippi River Delta. Petroleum exploration had
caused more subsidence, further compromising the
wetlands. As a consequence, Louisiana lost 1900
square miles of wetlands between 1930 and 2004.6
The wetlands had acted as a natural sponge, absorbing storm surges and protecting New Orleans and
other populated areas. With this natural sponge severely eroded, almost nothing could absorb Katrina's storm surge before it struck the populated areas
of the Gulf Coast. Additionally, subsidence reduced the heights of the levees by as much as three
feet below their original design.7
" Further damage to the wetlands was caused by the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MR. GO), a canal
completed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1960s. 8
MR. GO also acted as a funnel for water being
forced up toward the city, leading to the breaches
that would cause massive flooding in New Orleans'
Lower Ninth Ward. 9
" Levees constructed by the Corps of Engineers to
protect New Orleans from flooding were reinforced
by sheet piles consisting of interlocking steel sup-

6 Joel

K. Boume, Jr., Gone with the Water, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct.
2004, at 88.
7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
OF
THE NEW ORLEANS AND SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE

1-4 (June 1,2006).
K. Bourne, Jr., New Orleans:A PerilousFuture, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 2007, available at
PROTECTION SYSTEM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8 Joel

http://ngn-nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0708/feature1/index.ht ml.
9Id.
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ports.10 An investigation subsequent to Katrina has
shown that the sheet piles "were too shallow to prevent [a] flow" of water underneath them. 1 "Tests.
. found that sheet piles reached only 10 feet below
sea level in some spots, far less than would protect
the city.' 12 The Corps' designs had called "for a
depth of 171 feet, but even that, the investigators
say, would have been too shallow."' 13 "[I]n spots
where the levees" were subsequently repaired, the
Corps of Engineers called "for sheet piles to be driven to depths of 51 to 65 feet."' 4 Soil material incorporated into the levees was also found
inadequate for the circumstances. 15 The levees
therefore lacked adequate foundation support.
While Katrina's storm surge would have crested the
levees in any event, the waters would have likely
receded without serious flooding had the levees remained intact. Lacking adequate support, however,
the levees gave way, causing several New Orleans
neighborhoods (in particular, the predominately
African-American Lower Ninth Ward) to be inundated with water. Not long before the storm, a request for $105 million to improve the levee system
had been reduced by the administration of President
George W. Bush to $40 million, despite re eated
warnings regarding the region's vulnerability.

'0John Schwartz & Christopher Drew, Louisiana'sLevee Inquiry

FaultsArmy Corps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A28.
llId.
12

13

Id

1d.

14

1d.

15INDEPENDENT LEVEE INVESTIGATION TEAM, UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

AT BERKELEY, NEW ORLEANS SYSTEMS HURRICANE KATRINA XVIII
APP.
AT
16

1-7 (2006).

Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.

3, 2005, at A21.
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" The levees were subject to a confusing and inefficient administrative structure. A tangled web of local authorities, often preoccupied with unrelated
projects, shared authority over the levees with the
Corps of Engineers. Responsibility was fragmented
and unclear. With so many in charge, nobody was
really in charge. The various structures built to contain hurricanes did not function as a system and
lacked redundancy. Compromises in one part of the
"system" produced by political forces or environmental concerns were not compensated for elsewhere, where other agencies might be in control.
* Global warming may have played a role in Katrina's having become such a powerful storm. "[S]ea
surface temperature records show that the oceans
[and other large bodies of water (like the Gulf of
Mexico)] are more than 1 degree F[ahrenheit] warmer on average today to a century ago." 17 "Because
hurricanes draw strength from heat in ocean surface
waters," warmer water potentially "generate[s]
more powerful hurricanes."1 8 Water temperatures
fluctuate in any event, "[b]ut the higher the average
[temperature,] the more likely the water will be
warm enough to produce a strong storm on any given day during the hurricane season." 19 So while we
cannot say with any assurance that global warming
caused Katrina, the probability of severe hurricanes
like Katrina was significantly enhanced by global
warming. This idea may help explain why, for the
first time, the Tropical Prediction Center (the agen17Pew

Center on Global Climate Change, Katrina and Global Warm-

ing: Was Katrina'sPower a Productof Global Warming?, availableat

http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Aug.
23, 2007).
18id.

19Id.
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cy that assigns names to hurricanes) ran all the way
through the alphabet in 2005.20
While public authorities had ample warning of Hurricane Katrina, they failed to mobilize a transport
system equal to the need for evacuation. Many of
the poor residents of the region (and in particular
the poor African-American residents of the region)
lacked automobiles of their own. These people
were dependent upon public transportation to leave
the city. 2 1 Little, if any such transportation materialized. Two days before the hurricane, Amtrak
routes that normally serve New Orleans were terminated in Memphis and Atlanta.2 2 (French tourists
stranded in New Orleans before the storm went instinctively to the railroad station and were bewil20

Hurricane names are agreed upon at international meetings of the

World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and once a storm system
with counterclockwise circulation reaches wind speeds of thirty-nine
miles per hour or greater, the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in
Miami, Florida, assigns the system one of the pre-determined names.
National Hurricane Center, Naming Hurricanes,available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/basics/naming.shtml (last
visited June 26, 2007). The most active hurricane season, prior to
2005, was in 1933 when the season produced twenty-one named tropical cyclones; in 2005, the season produced twenty-eight named systems, running the TPC completely through the WMO's alphabetized
list of names and making 2005 the most active season to date. ERIC S.
BLAKE, ET AL., THE DEADLIEST, COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2006 14 (Apr. 2007),

availableat http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/DeadliestCostliest.shtm.
21 Jason DeParle, What Happens to a Race Deferred, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, § 4 at 1 (reporting that even among the poor in New Orleans,
African-Americans were less likely than whites to own automobiles)
availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/weekinreview/04depa.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008).
22 Amtrak, Service Alert: Hurricane Katrina Update, available
at
http://www. amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2
Copy/SimpleCopy_.Popup&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554014709 (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008).

19
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dered to find it closed.23 ) Hundreds of the city's
school buses remained in their parking lots; these
buses became disabled when the lots were
flooded. 24 The City ordered an evacuation, but
made no provision to assist residents in evacuation
efforts. Indeed, buses out of the city did not materialize for several days after the hurricane struck.2 5
With 30% of National Guard units tied up in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and the White House claiming ignorance of severe flooding until several days after
the storm, the federal government was slow to mobilize for an evacuation. 26
Government on all levels (i.e., the city, the state,
and the federal government) was particularly impotent when it came to providing aid to people in the
beleaguered area after the hurricane hit. Those
stranded in New Orleans were told to report to the
Louisiana Superdome, where they would find provisions. As many as 50,000 people heeded that call,
only to find a facility that was ill-prepared to accommodate them.27 The hurricane caused a power
outage, and with it, the absence of air-conditioning,
leaving people to bake in the Louisiana heat while
trapped inside the indoor stadium. 28 Basic sanitation soon broke down in the huge facility. Reports
23 Dan Baum, New OrleansPostcard:Consulat DInfluence, THE NEW
30. This episode illustrates a major difference between American and European expectations regarding public
transportation.
24 BRINKLEY, supra note
5, at 359.
25
/d. at 386.
YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at

Julian Borger & Duncan Campbell, Why Did Help Take So Long to
Arrive?, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4.
27 See Robert Tanner, Thousands Evacuatedfrom New OrleansSaturday, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 3, 2005, availableat
http://www.wwlt v.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/katrina/stories/0903
05ccKatrinawcMainstory. If76bb86.html.
28 BRiNKLEY, supra note 5, at 191-93.
26

20
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of assaults, rapes, and even murders were rampant;
while most of these reports were later discredited, a
sense of anarchy was prevalent.29 Several thousand
additional victims sought refuge in New Orleans'
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, from which
reports of anarchy surpassed those coming from the
Superdome. (At least one confirmed murder did
occur at the Convention Center . 30) Anarchy was also evident in the streets of New Orleans, where
many business establishments fell victim to looters. 3 1 Some of these "looters" could hardly be
blamed, as they were procuring food, water, and
other supplies necessary to sustain the stranded
population. 32
" Other aspects of the rescue, such as relief for victims stranded in the floodwaters, were similarly disorganized. Approximately one-third of the members of the New Orleans Police Department deserted their posts. 33 National Guard units were slow
in coming; the efforts of these and other law enforcement officials who arrived from as far away as
Oregon and Puerto Rico were uncoordinated, lacking any central command.34 Some of the law enforcement units seemed more intent on quelling
rioting than on providing relief to flood
non-existent
35
victims.
* In at least one instance, citizens of New Orleans
found themselves to be victims of bad neighbors.
Id. at 193, 240, 476.
Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Reports of Anarchy at Superdome
Overstated, SEATTLE TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2005, at Al.
31 BRINKLEY, supra note 5, at 200-05, 276.
32
Id. passim; Tanner, supra note 27.
33 Dan Baum, Deluged: When KatrinaHit, Where Were the Police?,
THENEW
YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006, at 50, 60.
34
29
30

35

Id.

id.
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Attempting to leave the stricken city and looking for
high ground, several hundred New Orleans residents tried crossing the Mississippi to Gretna, Louisiana, where they were met by a sheriff's
department intent on turning them back.3 6 Escape
from the devastated city, even for those willing and
able to walk, was thereby blocked.
B.

37
"It ain't my fault. ,

The devastation of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath suggest a natural disaster the consequences of which
were severely exacerbated by an abdication of governmental responsibility on all levels. That the human failure was
primarily one of government is hard to deny. While individuals had, to be sure, taken it upon themselves to live in
New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast, they did so
in reliance on a system of levees, canals, navigation, and
transportation engineered, built, and maintained primarily
by government. Indeed, only government could have constructed and maintained a system of such scale. Yet the
American government, which had, only a few months earlier, raced halfway around the world to provide aid for victims of a giant tsunami, was now found seriously wanting
when faced with a natural disaster at home.
The immediate target of public wrath was Michael
D. Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and a man clearly in over his head. In the days
following Katrina's onslaught, Brown was depicted as
studiously ignorant about the conditions in New Orleans,
more concerned about his attire and dinner schedule than
36

Chip Johnson, PoliceMade Their Storm Misery Worse, S.F. CHRON,

Sept. 9, 2005, availableat http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file-/c/a2005/09/09/BAGL1EL1 KH1.DTL.
37 SMOKEY

JOHNSON, IT AIN'T

MY FAULT (Night Train International

2000).
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the coordination of relief for the stricken region. Nevertheless, President Bush, in cheerleader mode, proclaimed,
"Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job[!]" as New Orleans
sank into the mire. 38 Shortly thereafter, Brown would find
himself in the position of scapegoat for the muffed operation, becoming comic fodder for late-night television hosts
in a Warholian moment of infamy. He would resign later
in September, only to establish
a business as a disaster
39
consultant.
preparedness
But to blame a single individual for the disaster was
to miss the point. Brown was representative of two much
larger phenomena: a diffusion of responsibility among a
patchwork quilt of federal, state, and local authorities; and
an administration in Washington that appeared to be less
than fully committed to some of the most essential functions of government. 40 Evidence of the latter problem had
previously surfaced in connection with the war in Iraq.
While many would come to dispute the need to invade Iraq
in 2003 and to deplore the manipulation of intelligence
used to justify the invasion, few would argue that national
defense is not an essential function of government. Yet
even as it schemed to carry on a war against Iraq, the administration failed to adequately equip the military to proceed with its mission. Military experts lamented the
inadequate number of troops deployed for the mission; the
understaffing violated a core principle of the "Powell Doctrine," which espoused the use of force that is "overwhelm-

Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Arrives in Alabama, Briefed on Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 2, 2005),
38

availableat

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/O9/2OO50902_2.htm-.
39 Mark

Leibovich, A Punch Line Who Refuses to FadeAway, N.Y.
Aug. 26, 2006, at Al1.
Krugman, Op-Ed., Killed By Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2005, at A21.
TIMES,
40 Paul
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ing and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy., 41
Despite months of planning, soldiers lacked body armor
and other essential equipment.4 2 Events suggested the
absence of any plan to secure either Iraq's munitions or its
national treasures from looting as the conquest of that
country was completed. The looting in turn helped supply
a protracted insurgency about which the administration had
43
been warned, but which did not figure into its plans.
Even the administration's highest priorities seemed
thwarted by either a lack of foresight or a fundamental
unwillingness to commit public resources to essential functions.
The "less government the better" philosophy of the
Bush Administration-a recurring theme of Republican
Party rhetoric since 1980 44 -resulted in a lack of seriousThe Powell Doctrine was espoused by General Colin Powell, while
serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991. Other elements of the Powell Doctrine: that military action should be used only
as a last resort and only where there was a clear risk to national security
by the intended target; that there must be strong support for the campaign by the general public; and that there must be a clear exit strategy
41

from the conflict. See Colin Powell, U.S. Forces: ChallengesAhead,

71 FOREIGN

AFF.

32 (1992).

When the Secretary of Defense was called to account for this, his
response was "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army
you might want or wish to have at a later time." Eric Schmitt, Troops'
42

Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive, N.Y.

TIMES,

Dec. 9, 2004, at

Al (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld).
43 Prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq predicted
insurgency in the wake of the conquest of Iraq. STAFF OF S. SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 110TH CONG., REPORT ON PREWAR
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ (Comm.

Print
2007), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/prewar.pdf.
44 The Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan, elected
in 1980, reduced non-military governmental expenditures, but continued the military buildup begun by its predecessor. This buildup is
widely credited with ending the Cold War with a Soviet government
that was unable to compete. Jeffrey W. Knopf, Did Reagan Win the
Cold War?, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Aug. 2004, availableat
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ness about the responsibilities of government and the staffing of the administration by those, like Mr. Brown, for
whom a government post was a reward for party loyalty
rather than competence, a path to power but not public
service. 45 In the conservative catechism, "good government" was an oxymoron, so government might as well
serve as an object of plunder, rather than as a form of public service.
None of this, however, was likely to surprise proponents of social choice theory. As Professor Frank Michelman has explained, social choice theorists explain public
policy choices as manifestations of "no public or general or
social interest,...

only concatenations of particular inter-

ests or private preferences., 46 If government was to be
viewed not as an instrument to serve the people, but rather
as an opportunity to advance one's personal interests, it was
easy to see how an agency like FEMA could be transformed into a fiefdom bereft of a long-term plan for disaster response, or for it to engage in what New York Times
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.nilsi/2004/aug/knopfAUG04.pdf. For a

discussion of Soviet failures, see infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
4'The practice was repeated in other sectors of government. Most

notably, staffing at the Justice Department, which traditionally had
been the bailiwick of career professionals, took on a partisan edge
during the administration of George W. Bush. See CQ Transcripts
Wire, Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary Committee, THE
WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, availableat
http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-

srv/politics/transcripts/goodlingtestimony_052307.html; Margaret
Talev & Marisa Taylor, U.S. Attorneys Saga Exposes Weakened Justice
DepartmentIndependence, THE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 18, 2007,

available at
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/newssentinel/news/editorial/

7386647.

htm. Federal legislation prohibits appointment of certain federal employees on the basis of political affiliation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(l)(E)
(2007).
46 Frank I. Michelman, PoliticalMarkets and Community SelfDetermination:Competing JudicialModels ofLocal Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1977).
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columnist Maureen Dowd called "a chilling lack of empathy combined with a stunning lack of efficiency." 47 Indeed,
the entire Homeland Security apparatus of which FEMA
was a part, conceived as a necessary device to avert future
September 11-type disasters, had become, in short order, a
repository for congressional pork barrels, with rural police
and fire departments in favored districts awash in funds
while their urban counterparts (the more likely targets of
future terrorist attacks) struggled to make-do. 48 Meanwhile, the federal government, rather than shrinking in size
(a modest accomplishment of the Clinton Administration)
actually grew, as domestic expenditures, 49 and along with
them, the budget deficit, soared during the first five years
of the George W. Bush presidency. 5 1 As more than one
47 Maureen Dowd, supra note 16, at A2
1.
48 Dean E. Murphy, Security Grants Still Streaming to Rural States,

N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al. In Katrina's wake, Republicangoverned Mississippi received a disproportionately larger amount of
federal relief than Democratically-governed Louisiana. See Larry
Copeland, In Mississippi,Katrina Recovery GainingSteam, USA
TODAY, July 24, 2006, availableat
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-24-missrebuilds-x.htm; Adam Nossiter, Senators atLouisianaHearing Criticize
FederalRecovery Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at A16.
49
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL BUDGET DATA, 8 TABLE
7
(2006) availableat http://www.cbo.gov/budget/data/historical.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008).
50 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007: Summary of Tables 315, Table S-3 (2006)
availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/pdf/budget/tables.pdf
!last visited Feb. 4, 2008).
1
Belatedly, some Republicans came to lament the Bush Administration's enlargement of government and Congressional use of budgetary
earmarks. In explaining how the conservative movement has been
undermined, conservative activist Richard Viguerie states,
[Wihen you add everything up, what you have is a
massive overreach of executive powers, and massive
overspending by people who claim they're conservatives.
Every President, with hardly any exceptions, will take as
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wag has noted, "For years, Republicans had told us that
government was bad; when they came to power, they
proved it." As a consequence Americans, who had raced
halfway around the world to aid victims of an Asian tsunami eight months prior to Katrina, seemed incapable of taking care of their own when disaster struck the Gulf Coast.
At a Congressional hearing following the Katrina
disaster, FEMA Director Brown alleged that Louisiana
Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray
Nagin (both Democrats) bore most, if not all the blame, for
the failures in the response to Katrina, and that Brown's
own only mistake had been not to realize sooner the
inability of Blanco and Nagin to perform their duties. 52 In
subsequent testimony, Brown blamed the Department of
Homeland Security and his White House patrons-but not
himself-for the federal government's lack of preparation
A
and its delay in providing relief and rescue. 53
Congressional
committee,
composed
entirely
of
Republicans, would focus its blame on Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff.54 According to the panel's
chairman, Mr. Chertoff had "primary responsibility for
much power as he gets. That's what Presidents do. Bush
has tried more than most. And it was supposed to be the
Republicans in Congress who would do oversight of the
President, so that he wouldn't get away with too much
abuse of power. But they abdicated that role. It was all
about the maintenance of power, and now look where
they are.
Jeffrey Goldberg, Party Unfaithful: The Republican Implosion, THE
NEW
YORKER, June 4, 2007, at 40, 45.
52

HurricaneKatrina: The Role of the FederalEmergency Management
Agency: H. Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation
for & Response to HurricaneKatrina, 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005)

(testimony
of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
53
HurricaneKatrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership:S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & GovernmentalAffairs, 109th Cong. (Feb.

10, 2006) (testimony of Michael D. Brown, former FEMA Director).
See Spencer S. Hsu, KatrinaReport Spreads Blame: Homeland
Security, Chertoff Singled Out, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
54
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managing the national response to a catastrophic disaster,"55 yet, as the committee reported, he had handled his
decision-making responsibilities "late, ineffectively, or not
at all.
A Bush Administration report focused on a need
for administrative reorganization that would divide various
functions among several government agencies, some in
different departments-this only a few short years after a
major government reorganization through which the Department of Homeland Security was created.57 A Senate
report subsequent to Katrina recommended abolishing
FEMA and creating another Homeland Security unit, a
"National Preparedness and Response Authority." 58 Apparently, performance would be improved by rearranging
the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Government lapses in connection with Hurricane
Katrina were by no means the exclusive domain of the
Republican Party. Under both major parties, the Corps of
Engineers had developed a reputation for heavyhandedness, enjoying hegemony over flood control and
paying little heed to the environmental consequences of its
actions, while feeding off pork-barrel appropriations from
Democratic, as well as Republican, Congresses. 59 Katrina
HurricaneKatrina: The Role of the Departmentof HomelandSecurity: Select BipartisanComm. to Investigate the Preparationfor and
Response to HurricaneKatrina, 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (opening
55

statement of Tom Davis, chairman).
56

A FAILURE

OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT ON THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RE-

H. REP. No. 109-377, at 2-3 passim
(2nd Sess. 2006); see Hsu, supra note 54 at Al.
7 George W. Bush Administration, The Federal
Response to Hurricane
Katrina:Lessons Learned, 65-82 (2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-leamed.pdf.
SPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,

58 S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.

& GOVERNMENTAL

AFFAIRS,

A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. No. 109322,
RECOMMENDATIONS 607 (2006).
59

HURRICANE KATRINA:

TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE

& NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N,

CROSSROADS: CONGRESS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND WASTEFUL WA-
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found Democrats in state and city governments in Louisiana and New Orleans dropping the ball in planning, execution, and emergency response. Nevertheless, the inept Ray
Nagin would be re-elected as New Orleans' mayor in May
2006, demonstrating the tendency of the electorate to close
ranks around homegrown incompetence.
C.

Photo-op politics.

American politicians tend to deal with squeakywheel, crisis-of-the-moment issues that are conducive to
"photo opportunities" and other media coverage, but not to
engage in long-term planning or quiet reflection. Much
like corporate officers whose visions runs only to the end of
the current quarter, politicians tend to address the hotbutton issue of the day, with their responses tailored to
exploit whatever momentary political advantage can be
obtained, rather than taking a long view of the public interest. Be it the devastation of Katrina, a coal mine disaster
that takes a dozen lives, 60 or even a professional quarter-

TER PROJECTS

2-3 (2000), availableat

http://www.nwf.org/wildlife/pdfs/Crossroads.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2008).

Representative of this behavior was the response to the Sago Mine
disaster in January 2006, which took the lives of twelve miners. Ian
Urbina & Andrew W. Lehren, U.S. Is Reducing Safety Penaltiesfor
Mine Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at Al "[T]he operator [of the
Sago Mine] had been cited 273 times since 2004. None of the fines,
[however,] exceeded $460." Id. The New York Times reported that this
was typical of the pattem of reduced mine safety enforcement by the
Bush Administration, which, even after imposing fines far smaller than
the maximum allowable, was lax in their collection. Id. The Congressional response was to introduce legislation to increase the maximum
fines allowable, not to demand better enforcement of existing law. Id.
60

Lest one surmise that the Bush Administration's tendency to compromise with mine operators reflected the needs of a struggling industry,
one should note that the International Coal Group, which operates the
Sago Mine, reported $110 million in net profits during 2005. Id.

29

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

30

back's involvement in a dog fighting ring,6 ' the typical
legislative response is a predictable one: press conferences,
legislative hearings, grandstanding, and still more legislation, rather than effective oversight regarding implementation of legislation already in effect.
The Bush
Administration may have been derelict in attending to disaster relief after Katrina, but it retained enough media
savvy to stage a dramatically-lit and heavily scripted Presidential television address from Jackson Square in New
Orleans a few days after the storm.
That publicity-mongering and point-scoring is a bipartisan affair that can be demonstrated by the grandstanding that attended the arrival of $3 per gallon gasoline prices
in the spring of 2006. Democrats were eager to blame the
cost of gas (still substantially less than what Europeans
were accustomed to paying) on price-gouging by the oil
companies and the short-sightedness of the Bush Adninistration and to urge adoption of deficit enhancement measures such as "a sixty-day halt on collecting federal gasoline
taxes." 62 The Bush Administration, in a conspiracy with
Big Oil, was depriving Americans of their God-given right
to drive, and there were political points to be scored.
Meanwhile, Republican leaders proposed a $100-per-driver
tax rebate, 63 presumably to be financed by more federal
61A more

recent example of Congressional grandstanding was Senator
John Kerry's pledge to introduce tougher federal legislation to ban dog
fighting. Senator Kerry's pledge came in the wake of revelations of a
dog-fighting ring that included Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael
Vick, who eventually pled guilty to federal charges. See Senator John
Kerry's Online Office, Kerry Asks NFL Commissioner to Immediately
Suspend Vick Over "Sickening"Dogfighting Case, July 20, 2007,

http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=279464.
62 Edmund L. Andrews & Michael Janofsky, Second Thoughts in
Congress on Oil Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
63 Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Domenici Introduces the Gas Price and Rebate Act of
2006 (Apr. 27, 2006) availableat
http://energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
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borrowing from East Asian banks. 64 "'Political anxiety in
an election year is to blame for a lot of the bad bills Congress passes,' said Representative Jeff Flake," an Arizona
Republican who opposed this short-lived proposal. 65 Leaders of neither major party took pains to point out the need
to develop a real national energy policy, to promote conservation (and with it, public transportation), and to invest
in alternative sources of energy-in other words, anything
requiring6 planning or sacrifice on the part of the American
people.

6

This infantile attitude toward governance seeks refuge in "painless" solutions, in which constituents are
treated not as citizens, but consumers; not as responsible
participants in a common enterprise, but as supplicants
hoping to feed from a public trough. Rather than demand
of the American public, as President Kennedy did, that we
"ask not what [our] country can do for [us], but what [we]
can do for [our] country,",67 present-day politicians ask
Americans to consider whether we are "better off now than

Detail&PressReleaseid=234941 &Month=4&Year=2006&Party= 1
2ast visited Feb. 4, 2008).
See U.S. Treasury Department, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury
Securities (May. 15, 2006), availableat
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. (charting major foreign holders of
treasury securities from November 2006 to November 2007).
65 Carl Hulse et al., Republicans Drop a Tax Plan After Business Leaders Protest,N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at Al.
66 Lamenting the "utterly shameless, utterly over-the-top Republican
pandering and Democratic point-scoring that have been masquerading
as governing in response to this energy crisis," New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman called for the creation of a third political
party because neither major party is willing to tell Americans what they
need to hear: that a solution "requires sacrifice today for gain tomorrow." Thomas L. Friedman, Let's (Third) Party, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2006, at A25.
67 President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961).
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we were four years ago." 68 War is waged in Iraq, for a
number of reasons, some justified, some contrived, but
instead of urging us to shared sacrifice, the administration
and Congress rewards us (or at least the most affluent
among us) with tax reductions. Pork barrel expendituresnot for improved levees in New Orleans, but for bridges to
nowhere in Alaska-grow to budget-busting proportions
through an undemocratic "earmarking" process, all to be
financed not through user fees or taxes, but through the
blue smoke and mirrors of supply-side economics and fanciful growth projections. In the days following Katrina's
onslaught, Thomas Friedman observed,
Besides ripping away the roofs of New Orleans, Katrina ripped away the argument that
we can cut taxes, properly educate our kids,
compete with India and China, succeed in Iraq,
keep improving the U.S. infrastructure, and
take care of a catastrophic emergency - without
putting ourselves totally into the debt of Beijing.
So many of the things the Bush team
has ignored or distorted under the guise of
fighting Osama were exposed by Katrina: its
refusal to impose a gasoline tax after 9/11,
which would have begun to shift our economy
much sooner to more fuel-efficient cars, helped
raise money for a rainy day and eased our dependence on the world's worst regimes for
energy; its refusal to develop some form of national health care to cover the 40 million uninsured; and its insistence on cutting more taxes,
even when that has contributed to incomplete
Soon to be President, Ronald Reagan, asked Americans to consider,
"whether you are better off today than four years ago." President
Ronald Reagan, Reagan-Carter Presidential Debate (Oct. 28, 1980).
68
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levees and too small an Army to deal with 69Katrina, Osama and Saddam at the same time.
Critics of the war in Iraq have complained that it
has left the American military stretched too thin.70 But the
stretch is not beyond that which we are capable; it is simply
71
beyond that which we have been willing to commit.
Today's global military commitments are fulfilled not by
sons and daughters drafted from the citizenry-at-large, but
by an "all-volunteer" army, consisting primarily of lowincome people with few economic alternatives, gleaned
from America's urban ghettoes and rural communities.72 A
less populous, less affluent United States of America was
able to stretch its military around the globe during World
War II, but that was an enterprise to which the nation was
fully committed, for which the administration in power had
prepared the American people to sacrifice, and in which
most American families had a direct stake, often through
one or more of its members in military service. Americans
would have been similarly disposed to sacrifice after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But instead of
imploring us to shared sacrifice, the President told Americans to "live your lives and hug your children., 73 The tax
breaks and pork-barrel expenditures continued. A critic of

69

Thomas L. Friedman, Osama and Katrina,N.Y.

2005,
at A25.
70
See generally LYNN E. DAVIS,

TIMES,

Sept. 7,

ET AL., STRETCHED THIN: ARMY

(2005) (prepared for the United
States Army).
71This lack of commitment may find its roots in the omission of Powell
Doctrine principles from war planning. See generally Powell, supra
note 41.
72 The army's current recruiting slogan, An Army of One, hardly brings
to mind the more communitarian, brothers-in-arms philosophy of what
Tom Brokaw and others have called "the Greatest Generation."
73George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001).
FORCES FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS

33

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

34

the Bush Administration captured its post-September
11
74
party!"
Let's
war.
at
"We're
words,
the
attitude with
Granted, it is difficult for a president to tell the
American people that it is time for us to eat our vegetables.
But we have gorged on a diet of sweets and fats for too
long. Indeed, the recent upswing in obesity among Americans, young and old-and with it, the growth in related
maladies such as diabetes and heart disease-is an apt
75
metaphor for our debt-plagued government and society.
The time has come for all of us to take responsibility.
II.

COUNTERPOINT: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER.

A.

A nuclear whirlwind.

In the context of responsible governing, Katrina
was, both literally and figuratively, a reaping of the whirlwind. Poor planning and neglect had come home to roost
in the flooded streets of New Orleans in a visible, demonFriedman, supra note 66 (referring to a statement by Joel Hyatt).
Conservative activist Richard Viguerie has pointed out that Bush has
followed in the "guns-and-butter" footsteps of President Lyndon B.
Johnson, abjuring the approach of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry S. Truman, and Ronald Reagan, who cut discretionary domestic
spending as they increased defense spending. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE,
CONSERVATIVES BETRAYED 25 (2006).
75 An article by Jackson Lears espouses this concept.
Americans are awash in red ink. Consumer indebtedness
is soaring, the savings rate is down to zero and people are
filing for bankruptcy at record rates. To many observers,
these are symptoms of cultural decline, from sturdy thrift
to flabby self-gratification--embodied in the current obesity epidemic. The fattest nation on earth is also the
greediest consumer of global resources and now is borrowing more than ever to satisfy its appetites.
Jackson Lears, The Way We Live Now: The American Way of Debt,
N.Y. TIMEs MAG., June 11,2006, at 13. The article goes on to
suggest that commentators have historically lamented Americans'
tendency toward indebtedness. Id. at 13-16.
74
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strable way. Were the solution to dysfunctional government simply more government, or the consolidation of
power in a single, central government, the remedy could be
derived fairly easily, but solutions to complex problems are
seldom this facile. The past century has provided many
lessons regarding the danger of imposing an all-powerful
government as alpha and omega of all matters. Few were
as vivid as the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster, which
rocked the Soviet Union in April 1986. The explosion at
the nuclear facility near the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl
immediately killed thirty-one people, required the evacuation of 135,000 others, and contaminated an area roughly
the size of England.76 The precise number of cancers and
other illnesses attributable to the disaster will never be
ascertained, but the numbers are probably in the thousands,
with genetic damage possibly being passed down through
several generations. A United Nations report issued in the
fall of 2005 suggested that 4,000 people would, in the end,
die from diseases caused by direct exposure to the radiation.77 Greenpeace, an environmental group not immune
from the use of hyperbole, released its own response in
April 2006 (twenty years after the explosion), claiming that
in the final analysis Chernobyl would kill at least 90,000.78
Chernobyl was the product of a centrally planned
economy in which the government based in Moscow was
the first and last authority. Without private enterprise, a
free press, or internal checks and balances to constrain it,
there was nothing to prevent the Soviet state from engaging
76

NEA

COMMITTEE ON RADIATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, CHERNOBYL

TEN YEARS ON RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH IMPACT

18, 27-28 (1995),

available at http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/chemobyl/vrml/chemobyl.htnl.

Press Release, World Health Org., et al., Chernobyl: The True Scale
of the Accident (Sept. 5,2005).
77

78 GREENPEACE, THE CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE:
CONSEQUENCES ON
HUMAN HEALTH 23 (I. Blokov et al. eds., 2006), availableat

http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/cher
nobylhealthreport.pdf.
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in a reckless course of action. The state could do no
wrong; there was nobody to compete with it, nobody to
criticize it, no mechanism to check its excesses.7 9 Marx
and Engels had instructed us that in time, the state would
just wither away; in the meantime, it imposed a structure
that dominated human endeavor to a greater degree than
anything mankind had previously seen, with a death grip
that stifled initiative, ambition, and progress.
To be sure, Chernobyl was not the only disaster
caused by Soviet-style totalitarianism. The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), Stalin's massacre of the kulaks, and the repression of the
Gulag were among hundreds of examples of the excesses of
the Soviet state. But Chernobyl demonstrated that Sovietstyle totalitarianism was not even technically competent.
Military parity with the West would, for a time, mask the
Soviet Empire's economic weakness, but the Chernobyl
disaster revealed that even the vaunted Soviet nuclear program was a fagade covering a flawed and creaky infrastructure. The "workers' paradise" promised by Lenin and
Stalin spewed forth not only the devastation of Chernobyl
but also the environmental wasteland that covered much of
Eastern Europe and Russia by the time of the Soviet Empire's demise circa 1990. If the Katrina disaster presents a
sorry case of abdication of government responsibility, the
Chemobyl catastrophe stands as a harsh illustration of what
can occur when a society and its economy are characterized
by "all government, all the time."

79 The

regulatory process in the United States is not without its critics.
But the worst American nuclear plant mishap, Three Mile Island in
1979, paled in comparison to the Chemobyl disaster. Just one year
after the Three Mile Island incident, the author moved to a location just
twenty-five miles upwind of Three Mile Island, where he and his family have enjoyed a healthy portion of their lives. For all its shortcomings, a combination of private enterprise and government regulation
appears to have averted more serious nuclear disasters.

36

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

37

In Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, contemporary
observers saw Chernobyl as a clear signal that the Soviet
Union was not the technological powerhouse it had been
assumed to be. The nuclear plant disaster humbled the
Kremlin and emboldened those who would challenge the
Soviet Empire, causing it to topple within a few short years.
Similarly, in the aftermath of Katrina, people in the United
States and abroad came to wonder whether the world's only
remaining global superpower had the will as well as the
wherewithal to confront serious domestic challenges.
Chernobyl exposed raw the shortcomings of a "people's
dictatorship" that was more bluff than substance; in Katrina's aftermath, Americans could not help but wonder
whether we had lost the ability to take care of our own.
The Soviet experience demonstrated the danger of too
much government; the American that of not enough. In
both cases, disaster revealed underlying flaws in governing
philosophy. In both Moscow and Washington, the same
truth was exposed: the emperor had no clothes.
We hesitate to paint with too broad a brush. There
are nuances that work against our grand theory. Critics of
the United States Army Corps of Engineers have long
complained about that agency's unfettered hegemony over
flood control. 80 The single-mindedness of the Corps' undertakings, often oblivious to environmental consequences,
was more reminiscent of the blinders-on mentality of the
Soviet management philosophy than the chaotic mismanagement displayed by other American government agencies in Katrina's immediate aftermath. And while the
governments of New Orleans, Louisiana, and the United
States may have failed Katrina's victims, they were generously assisted by governments in other states, most notably Texas, which housed thousands of homeless people and
opened the schoolhouse doors to their children. Americans
80 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE & NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, Supra

note 59.
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also responded admirably to Katrina through nongovernmental efforts, raising disaster relief funds and volunteering in large numbers to aid the victims and rebuild
the Gulf Coast. 81 Indeed, the very existence of several
layers of responders, some public, some private, assured
that some relief would arrive for Katrina's beleaguered
victims. Two centuries ago, Alexis DeToqueville observed
that Americans had constructed a strong civil society to
compensate for the weakness of their government.82 That
structure has provided a measure of salvation in the wake
of Katrina and other demands to which our governments,
federal, state, and local, have been slow to respond.
While the Soviet government's initial reaction to
Chemobyl was the sort of tight-lipped non-disclosure characteristic of a totalitarian regime, Moscow's long-term
response was somewhat more enlightened and humane than
that which one might expect from an "evil empire." Within
a few days after the explosion, the Soviet government ordered and conducted mass evacuations and provided the
means for people to leave the contaminated area and to
sustain their lives thereafter. In so doing, it undertook a
81 Particularly

noteworthy were the efforts of the Mormon Church,
which quickly sped supplies and relief workers to the beleaguered Gulf
Coast. The Mormon Church-in its ability to mobilize its members for
the common good-demonstrates some of the finest aspects of civil
society. See All About Mormons, Mormon Humanitarian Efforts,
available at

http://www.allaboutmormons.com/mormon-humanitarian-service.php
(last visited June 26, 2007). The church's critics would say that it also
displays communitarian's darker side, with evidence of strong outgroup antagonisms. That is far more likely to have been true in the past
than the present. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Mountain Meadows

Massacre of 1857 and the Trials of John D. Lee: An Account (2006),
availableat
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/lee

account.html.
82

1 ALEXIS

DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

passim (Ge-

rald Bevan trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 2003).
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role not regarded as extraordinary for a socialist state. In
the cases of both Katrina and Chernobyl, problems resulting, at least in part, from either an excess or lack of government involvement were ameliorated through more
communitarian solutions: in one case, the compassionate
ministries of civil society and private charity; in the other,
the distributive justice philosophy of a socialist state. In
the end, our salvation lies in neither over-dependency on
government nor the abandonment of government responsibility, but rather somewhere in the middle. 83
B.

Averting Collapse.

In his excellent book, Collapse, Jared Diamond describes the sad fate of several of the world's civilizations,
each of which ultimately failed to thrive because of an
Diamond
unwise allocation of limited resources. 84
attributes societal collapse to a number of factors, including
environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors,
decreased support by friendly neighbors, and society's
response to environmental problems. 85 He acknowledges
that much environmental degradation is natural or inadvertent, but that it is the variable of human response that can
spell the difference between a society that disintegrates and
one that continues to thrive. 86 Diamond documents how in
environments as diverse as Easter Island and Norse Green83

Indeed, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Empire was neither as monolith-

ic nor as autocratic as it had once seemed. Nikita Khrushchev's "goulash communism" was evolving into Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost
and, ultimately perestroika. The meltdown of autocracy had begun
prior to the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, although the potency of
civil society in opposition to totalitarian government was more evident
in Warsaw Pact states such as Hungary and Poland than in the Soviet
Union
itself.
84
JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR

(2005).
SUCCEEDpassim
85

id.

86 id.
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land, ruling elites commandeered scarce resources for
themselves, neglecting the people without whose labor and
support the enterprise was doomed.87 As a consequence, it
was only a matter of time before resources ran dry and the
civilization collapsed. 88 The theory that collapse (or, in
less extreme cases, major economic deprivation) was not an
inevitable consequence of natural conditions is demonstrated by the differing fortunes of two peoples or political
systems inhabiting the same environment, such as the
Norse and Inuit in Greenland, or the Dominican
Republic
89
and Haiti on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola.
A relatively small, elite group might temporarily
thrive by hoarding resources and exploiting the populace.
For a time, less fortunate people will perform menial jobs,
serve in an "all volunteer" army, pledge fealty to a "worker's paradise," and pay taxes in the forlorn hope that they,
too, will someday share in the community's wealth. But
faith in the community and participation in the common
enterprise ultimately collapses unless the community is
reasonably responsive to the needs of all. Even Machiavelli recognized that "[a] wise prince will establish institutions
that can protect lives and property, respect different spheres
of social organization, and help his subjects pursue their
livelihoods." 90 Benjamin Franklin put it more colloquially
during the American Revolution: "We must indeed all hang
91
together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately."
87 id.
88 id.
89 id.
90

JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN

IDEA 58 (1999). Ehrenberg offers the following quotation from Ma-

chiavelli's The Prince: "A prince should also show his esteem for
talent, actively encouraging able men, and honoring those who excel in
their profession." Id.
91 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the signing of the Declaration of
Independence (July 4, 1776). See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 323 (Elizabeth Knowles ed. 1999).
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Ultimately, we are all in the same boat. Better for us to all
row together to safety than
to drop our oars and cannibalize
92
the weakest among us.
That is not to say that we all should be strapped into
our seats, beating out a cadence of strokes called out by a
single coxswain seated up front. The failure of communism has demonstrated how a centrally-controlled economy,
answering to the beat of a single drummer, stifles individual initiative and sucks the oxygen out of community. We
seek other models. Diamond calls our attention to the
Netherlands, where rich and poor alike realized over the
years that they would have to collaborate on an extensive
system of dikes and pumps in order to reclaim the land
from the sea. 93 A large storm that took 2,000 lives in 1953
prompted the Dutch to redouble their efforts; a Dutch academician-friend of mine explains that the Deltawerken (the
massive reinforcement of the dykes and the damming of
some estuaries) stemmed in part from a "Churchillian feeling that there was a war against the water, which required
sacrifices from all for a major effort to prevent any disaster
like that in the future." 94 Diamond quotes his Dutch
friend's description of life in the reclaimed lands, or "polders":
In the Netherlands, we have [an] expression,
'You have to be able to get along with your
enemy, because he may be the person operating
the neighboring pump in your polder.' And
For the legal consequences of the latter, see Her Majesty the Queen
v. Dudley, (1884) 14 Q.B.D 273 (D.C.).
93 DIAMOND, supra note 84.
94 E-mail from Wibren Van der Burg, Tilburg Univ., to author,
(Feb.
11, 2007) (in author's files). The legendary British Prime Minister's
name was invoked to signify the gravity of this immense national
effort, led by "a reasonably effective government that saw itself as the
leading agency in rebuilding the country and a minimally just and
solidaristic society after WWII." Id.
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we're all down in the polders together. It's not
the case that rich people live safely up on tops
of the dikes while poor people live down in the
polder bottoms below sea level. If the dikes
and pumps fail, we'll all drown together .... If
global warming causes polar ice melting and a
world rise in sea level, the consequences will
be more severe for the Netherlands than for any
other country in the world, because so much of
our land is already under sea level. That's why
we Dutch are so aware of our environment.
We've learned through our history that we're
all living in the same polder, and that our survival depends on each other's survival. 95
Comments Diamond:
That acknowledged interdependence of all
segments of Dutch society contrasts with current trends in the United States, where wealthy
people increasingly seek to isolate themselves
from the rest of society, aspire to create their
own separate virtual polders, use their own
money to buy services for themselves privately,
and vote against taxes that would extend those
amenities as public services to everyone else.
Those private amenities include living inside
gated communities, relying on private security
guards instead of the police, sending one's
children to well-funded private schools with
small classes rather than to the under-funded
crowded public schools, purchasing private
health insurance or medical care, [and] drinking
bottled water instead of municipal water. . ..
Underlying such privatization is a misguided
95 DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 519-20.
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belief that the elite can remain unaffected by
the problems of society around them: the attitude of those Greenland Norse chiefs who
found that they had merely bought themselves
96
the privilege of being the last to starve.
The collective effort in the Netherlands shaped an
environmentally conscious community in which capitalism
has nevertheless thrived more than in most places on
earth. 97 That care for the collective good would be conducive to a thriving capitalist economy should not really come
as a surprise. Indeed, no lesser proponent of capitalism
than Adam Smith recognized long ago that
[n]o society can surely be flourishing and
happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable. It is but
equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe,
and lodge the whole body of the people,
should have such a share of the produce of
their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged. 98
As we shall see, however, those who would promote individual initiative and an equitable distribution of resources
face special problems in the United States.

96

Id. at 520.
My Dutch friend explains that the polder boards may have been the
first democratic institutions in the Netherlands and account for the
country's egalitarian and democratic culture. Van der Burg, supra note
94.
97

98 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1776).
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IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT GOVERNMENT ROLE.

A.

A nation of tax protestors.

The United States of America is a nation founded
by tax protesters. The cry of the American Revolution was
"no taxation without representation"-acall for representative democracy at least as much as a revolt against taxes; a
political protest as much as a tax revolt. Nevertheless, antitax, and with it, anti-government, sentiment is very much a
part of the national DNA. King George III and his troops
represented repressive government; ergo, government must
be inherently repressive. 99 The centralization of power in
particular was to be avoided. Hence, a loose confederacy
of states was formed to succeed British imperial rule.
When that proved ineffectual, a federal government was
formed, in which constituent states would nevertheless
remain sovereign and retain many important government
powers. Government power was to be divided among governments with different competencies (i.e., the "division of
powers" between the national government and the states);
within each government, "separation of powers" was to
keep any one branch from exercising too much power. A
Bill of Rights, setting forth individual civil liberties in the
form of limitations on government power (e.g., "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." 100), became an
important part of the constitution of the new republic.
Government was a necessary evil, but an evil nevertheless,
to be constrained and divided.
99 A variation on this type of thinking might be found in contemporary

Russia. Under Soviet rule, Russians were told that capitalism was
corrupt; capitalists were portrayed in caricature as greedy, dishonest,
and underhanded. With the decline and fall of communism, Russians
seem to have believed their propagandists and embraced the most
corrupt form of capitalism. The caricature has become the fact.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The result was a country in which criticism, suspicion, and even derision of government is regarded as patriotic. A special target of this derision is the central
government in Washington. Politicians from Thomas Jefferson to George W. Bush have campaigned against Washington (the government, not the man, although there is
reason to believe that Jefferson secretly schemed against
the man as well' 0 1). Ronald Reagan built his political career on the following idea: the problem is not solved by
government, the problem is government.
Anti-government sentiment is the exclusive domain
of neither the left nor the right. Democrats, like Jefferson
(author of the Kentucky Resolutions10 2), Madison (principal drafter of the limited-powers Constitution), Jackson (foe
of the Bank of the United States), Bryan (the prairie populist), and Carter have dueled in anti-government rhetoric as
have Republicans like the Tafts (three of them), Coolidge
("the chief business of the American people is
ness" 103), Reagan, and the Bushes (again, three of them).
The rhetoric often takes on a populist, anti-lawyerly complexion. Peanut farmers (Jimmy Carter) and bodybuilderscum-Hollywood celebrities (Arnold Schwarzenegger) repeatedly remind voters, during political campaigns that
they are neither lawyers nor politicians, as if professional
training in the law or a life of public service is a form of
taint. But American lawyers, too, regard it as their sacred
duty to protect citizens against government power. The
101See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS

482-83 (Touchstone 2001).

Kentucky Resolutions, like Madison's Virginia Resolutions,
stated a case for nullification of acts of Congress deemed unconstitutional by the state legislatures. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1JANUARY 1798 TO
31 JANUARY 1799 550-56 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003); WILLIAM J.
102The

WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND THEIR LEGACY 170-71 (2004).
103President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the American Society of

Newspaper Editors in Washington D.C. (Jan. 25, 1925).
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crusading attorney, in both fact and fiction-Clarence Darrow, Atticus Finch, Thurgood Marshall-is seen at his
heroic best when defending the criminally accused against
an abusive government or challenging unfair or discriminatory government practices.
Even our national symbols have an antigovernment, rugged individualist aura about them. The
vigilant serpent of "Don't Tread on Me" fame was succeeded by a solitary eagle, a free-flying bird of prey, not a
pack animal like the wolf or a communitarian species like
the beaver (although Oregonians favor the latter). The
Father of Our Country, George Washington, is portrayed as
a Cincinnatus, disdainful of high office, eager to return to
the plow, accepting both a military commission and the
Presidency only with great reluctance. 104
Yet for all the bashing of government, we expect
government to perform when the chips are down. At one
time, apparently, it did. In the days following the San
Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, with the city in ruins
and thousands left homeless, at least one citizen was moved
104

The myth is only partially correct. Washington did resist imperial

trappings and titles as President and established the two-term tradition
(ignored by Franklin Roosevelt, then codified in the Twenty-second

Amendment). But he was a master politician, inventing several government institutions that survive to this day, successfully balancing off
personalities as diverse and contentious as Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Adams, and fending off all sorts of challenges. As for his military
command, Washington showed up at the Continental Congress in 1775
dressed in full military officer regalia. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776,
49-50 (Simon & Schuster 2005). What could he have been suggesting?
To his credit, Washington established the appropriate image
for the general-cum-politician in America. Military leaders who have
obtained high political office in this country have been the modest, selfeffacing, peace-loving sorts who have seen war and wish not to revisit
its horrors. We tend to elect and admire the Washingtons, Grants,
Eisenhowers, and Powells, not the strutting, autocratic McClellands,
MacArthurs, Pattons, and LeMays. We run (as we should) from the
man-on-horseback, the Caesar, or Napolean who will sweep us off our
feet and lay waste to our liberties.
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to write, "Everything's ruined.

47

But don't worry; govern-

105

The observation seems to have
ment is looking out."
been accurate. Federal troops, after some initial blunders,
soon thereafter brought relief to a homeless and stranded
population. Within ten days, a new trolley line was up and
running; the twenty-eight thousand buildings destroyed by
the quake would be replaced by 20,500 new ones within
three years. 10 6 Public and private resources combined to
build a new City by the Bay. Even a corrupt municipal
administration rose to the occasion.
The recent New Orleans experience stands in sharp
contrast. Even now, two years after Katrina, deliverance
seems almost as remote as in the days immediately following the storm. As of yet, no clear-cut game plan or consensus as to how to rebuild the city and its environs exists.
Instead, the Big Easy seems to be adrift. 107 Part of the
problem is a cacophony of interest groups unwilling to lay
their respective demands aside for the common good. But
a century of disillusionment has also driven American government from a "can do" to a "won't do" mentality. 108
Americans spend 350 days a year bashing government, starving it of resources, at least in those areas in
105PBS American Experience: The

GreatSan FranciscoEarthquake

(produced and directed by Tom Weidlinger), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/earthquake/filmmore/pt.html (Mar. 20,
2006).
106

id.

107
A metaphor for this drift may be the shrimp boats washed ashore

during Katrina, which remained tangled in the trees in Gulf Coast
communities ten months later. Dan Barry, 100-Ton Symbols of a
Recovery Still Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al.
'0'
Perhaps we are just sadder but wiser. During the "can-do govemment" era of the New Deal, Americans from Franklin Roosevelt to
Woody Guthrie extolled the virtues of massive federal reclamation and
irrigation projects such as the Grand Coulee and Bonneville Dams.
Today, we have come to recognize that an environmental price must be
paid for such "progress." We may have become less sure-headed and
more circumspect about such matters.
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which intervention might matter most. We spend the remaining two weeks deploring government's inability to
respond to the crisis of the moment: a hurricane in the Gulf,
landslides in California, wildfires in the Rockies, floods in
New England. Of course, few people really want the cessation of all government. Most societies have been formed
by people who recognized the need to band together to
protect common interests. Those societies quickly adopted
some sort of governance system. It may have been more or
less authoritarian in structure; it may have been more or
less oppressive to individual citizens or outsiders who come
into their midst; it may have been more or less tolerant of
free thinking or non-conformity on the part of individuals.
All too frequently, the broad common interests that created
the governing instrument in the first place have been abandoned in the course of rent-seeking efforts of individuals
and limited interest groups, or in selfish efforts to accumulate wealth or power on the part of individuals. Thus, in the
Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninism, a flawed, authoritarian
form of government that nevertheless had the welfare of the
masses as its core principle, quickly gave way to Stalinism,
a more oppressive form of Marxism whose chief aim
seemed to be the preservation in power of a totalitarian
leader. 109 In Africa, the promise of liberation from colonial
rule frequently turned sour, as despotic rulers plundered
national assets for personal gain. In America, the Republican Party, an organization formed with the noblest of
aims-the curtailment of slavery and the enhancement of
opportunity-has lately fallen into the hands of a coalition
of corporate oligarchs and religious
zealots, with adverse
110
consequences for the Republic.
109 These circumstances have been portrayed in an allegorical fashion in
literature. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (Penguin
Group 1945).
110 For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see generally KEvIN
PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY (2006).
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A Hobbesian view of the world would suggest that
this is the natural state of things. Under Thomas Hobbes'
philosophy, power is accumulated in a governing authority
because men would otherwise be at each other's throats.
Life is "nasty, brutish and short," and people willingly cede
whatever natural rights they possess in return for the protection of a leviathan who will shield them from external
and internal threats.111 Under this view, the pursuit of selfinterest on the part of the ruling oligarchy is but a deal
struck with the devil. Some crumbs might be thrown to the
populace, but its claim to civil liberties is abandoned in
favor of protection against the Hun, the Turk, the Bolsheviks, or Al-Qaeda. The more liberal Lockean view regards
things differently. According to John Locke, individuals
group together to serve their mutual interests, including
self-protection, but in doing so they retain certain basic
civil liberties. 112 These "natural rights" are not to be interfered with by the governing powers; to the extent intrusions
are permitted, they must be balanced against civil liberties. 11 3 The bombing of Pearl Harbor may justify war on
Japan, but it does not justify the internment of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry. Taxes may be collected and
people may be conscripted into military service, but the
government may not arbitrarily drag us from our homes at
night or beat confessions out of its citizens.
B.

Rights and responsibilities.

Communitarians are apt to reject the authoritarianism implicit in the Hobbesian view and are therefore more
likely to embrace the Lockean, "natural rights" view. But
communitarians will be quick to add that with rights come
111THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1 ch. 13 (1651).
112 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING

(1690).
13 Id.
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responsibilities, and that the assertion of individual rights
does not mean disregard for the needs of the community at
large. In America, however, the impulse against invasive
government power runs strong-so strong that we are reluctant to have government play the major role in promoting social welfare that is taken for granted in most
economically advanced societies. Our health care system is
a prominent example of this phenomenon. Resistance to a
comprehensive national health care system has been articulated on a number of grounds: the right to chose one's own
physician, the right of doctors to be independent contractors, the efficiencies and choices arguably provided by an
array of competing health insurance plans. But communitarians are apt to downplay the "rights talk," recognizing,
as Mary Ann Glendon does, that most public controversies
are best resolved through an adjustment of competing interests. 114 Refraining the issue as an interests-based discussion frees us to consider whether nationally-guaranteed
health coverage might benefit the nation as a whole and
whether a single-payer (or even just a single-form) health
insurance program might be more efficient than a system in
which each doctor must employ a cadre of specialists just
to process the forms required by a patchwork quilt of insur115
ers. Our Canadian neighbors enjoy universal health care
and more-more extensive public transportation,1 16 large
subsidies for higher education, 117 and stacks of firewood
free for the taking in national parks. Nevertheless, my
occasional forays to the north have unearthed no sense of
114

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE 15 (1991).
115

Judy Foreman, Why CanadiansAre Healthier,THE BOSTON GLOBE,

Feb. 10, 2004, at C2.
116 Michael R. Baltes, The ImportanceCustomers Place on Specific
Service Elements of Bus Rapid Transit, 6 J. OF PUB. TRANSP. 1, 5, 18
(2003).
117 Martin Trow, From Mass Higher Educationto UniversalAccess:
The American Advantage, 37 MINERVA 303, 304, 317-319 (1999).
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oppression or restraint of freedom on the part of Canadian
citizens. Perhaps the absence of the responsibilities of a
superpower-and the hubris that goes with it-provides
our Canadian neighbors with an air of freedom and a lighter
step to their feet. Or perhaps it is a stronger sense of community that allows them to recognize that health care is a
universal need, the availability of which should be dependent upon neither wealth nor employment status.
C.

The tragedy of the commons.

Communitarian theory suggests that when possible,
government responsibility should be vested in the smallest
units, as they are most likely to be responsive to the needs
of the community. 118 But communitarianism sometimes
requires broader government responsibility as to human
needs. In America, the impulse against centralization of
government power runs almost as strong as the antipathy
toward government in general. Whether our federal system
is the cause or the effect of resistance to central authority,
there is great reluctance to place the federal government in
charge of many aspects of public life that are entrusted to
central authority in other countries. School finance is a
prominent example of this phenomenon. In France (to cite
just one case), public education is regarded as a major responsibility of the central government. 119 Approximately
two-thirds of all school funding comes out of Paris, and the
quality of one's education is not a by-product of the wealth
of one's hometown. 20 In America, the regard for local
control is strong. Control over and financing of schools is
118 AMrrAI ETZIONI, The Responsive CommunitarianPlatform: Rights
and Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPON-

SIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 260 (1993).

119 Embassy of France in the United States, Education in France: The

School System, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/edu-fr.asp (last
visited
120 id. Jan. 15, 2008).

51

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

52

largely a local matter. 121 The state might take some inter-

est, but Washington is banished to the far comers of public
education. 122 The quality and type of education one receives in America thereby becomes largely a function of the
wealth and attitudes of one's local community-and the
results, of late, have been deplorable. 123
They have been deplorable at least in part because
many localities-even many that could not be considered
''poor" by any means-starve their public school systems.
This starvation subsists because while the greatest carping
about government power, size, and expenditures is reserved
for the federal government, people have the most direct
influence over taxes and expenditures on the local level. In
some states, like New York and New Jersey, voters must
approve school budgets through direct referendum. 124
Elsewhere, a school board member is only a telephone call
121 Some exceptions exist. Hawaii, for example, fmances all public

education through the state treasury. See Haw. Const. art. 10, § 1. See
generally HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1303 (Supp. 2006) (articulating

how the school budget and general fund are estimated).

122 Washington's primary involvement appears to be in the form of

unfunded mandates: decrees that states and local school districts must
comply with certain requirements as a condition for federal funding,
then paltry appropriations with respect to such funding. One such
example can be found in provisions for special education for students
with disabilities. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004);
see also No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115
Stat.
1425 (2002).
12 3

See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMER-

SCHOOLS 3-5 (1992) (detailing inequities in America's public
schools). In Chile, students, who are painfully aware of such inequities, have recently taken to the streets in opposition to a Pinochet-era
law that delegates education funding to local communities and private
enterprise. See Larry Rohter, ChileansPromised a New Deal: Now
Striking Youth Demand It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5, 2006, at Al 1. Thus, an
avowedly
socialist government has fallen short of the egalitarian ideal.
124
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 13-17 (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
2022 -2023 (McKinney 2000).
ICA'S

52

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

53

away-and unlike the congressional representative, she is
likely to answer the phone personally. The tragedy of the
commons takes hold, as elderly and childless voters, not
seeing a direct stake in the education of young people, rail
against high taxes, "bloated" school budgets, and "overpaid" teachers. 125 Having little recourse over state and federal
budgets, they use what leverage they can to control expenditures at the local level.
For decades, America's public schools were subsidized by the practice of sex discrimination. Women, largely excluded from professions such as law and medicine,
turned to nursing and teaching, for which they (and the
smaller number of males who opted for these callings)
accepted wages that would have been below market in a
truly free market, i.e., a market free of discrimination.
Now, with the more lucrative professions open to women,
the private-sector nursing market has begun to pay competitive wages. 126 Teachers, most of whom work in a publicly-financed school system, continue to earn depressed
wages. The profession is gradually depleted of its best
talent, who seek more lucrative positions elsewhere. To
extend the commons analogy, it now costs more to grow
the grass, but the public is unwilling to recognize the scarcity of seed and foot the bill.
What is lacking here is a broad sense of community.
Last year my new research assistant, recently exposed to
communitarianism, asked me how broadly we can define
community. A core question, to be sure. With respect to
some interests, it might be altogether appropriate to define
one's community as narrowly as one's immediate family,

121 The tragedy of the commons takes hold when a public resource (i.e.,
the commons) is depleted because individuals are unwilling to regulate
their use or pay the price necessary to sustain the resource. See Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
126 Cheryl L. Mee, Salary,NURSING 2005, Oct. 2005, at 46, 48.
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or one's church, or one's neighborhood. 127 But some functions (and I would contend that education is one of them)
require the financial commitment of an entire nation. For
still other purposes, such as the environment, our concerns
are that of a global community. In matters such as education and the environment our interests are so interwoven
that it is, in the long run, just as self-defeating to narrow
one's perspective to one's family or even one's town as it
was for the Norse chiefs described by Diamond to horde
Greenland's scarce resources. 128
The problems of health care and public education
have together come to a head in my local school district.
Our local teachers worked last year without a contract, and
our little town endured a short strike, because the school
board insisted that the teachers contribute more of their
own funds to their health insurance plan.129 While a contribution in the amount demanded by the board was unprecedented for our area's public schools, the squeeze is
not unlike those faced by any number of employers, locally
and nationally. General Motors, Delta Airlines, Wal-Mart,
and our local grocer and automobile mechanic all must face
rising health care premiums while selling goods and services in a competitive environment. In America, the mix of
public and private resources has generally served us well,
but an over-reliance on employers as the major source of
health insurance has crippled them against international
competition, subjected them (like our doctors) to increasing
amounts of red tape, and exacerbated labor strife all over
America. Greater recognition of public and national responsibility in this regard may not only make health care
accessible to all; it might allow Americans to get on with
127 ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND

COMMuNY: THE CASE OF TORTS 5 (2004).
128

DIAMOND, supra note 84, at 248-76.

129 Full disclosure requires me to note that my wife is one of our local

school teachers.
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business in a more globally competitive manner. Only our
distaste for "big government" stands in the way.
D.

"Painless"solutions.

Some of the rancor in our own school district is a
product of uncertainty regarding the future of Pennsylvania's system of public school finance. Recent experience
in that area provides some contrasts of particular interest to
communitarians. For the past several years, a Democratic
governor and a Republican legislature have tangled over a
funding scheme that would employ gambling proceeds
from slot-machines to reduce the tax burden. This "painless" approach to public finance works as a regressive tax
on the poor and hides the true cost of government services.
Rarely mentioned is the moral question of whether we
should finance our children's education through a bluesmoke-and-mirrors scheme dependent upon gambling
money drawn disproportionately from a low-income clientele.
A more communitarian approach to school finance
is demonstrated by a program adopted by some fourteen
Pennsylvania school districts. These districts accept inkind services from senior citizens in lieu of taxes. 130 Seniors serve as teachers' aides, lunchroom monitors, crossing guards, and tutors in exchange for tax forgiveness. The
need for tax relief on the part of skilled, public-spirited
citizens on fixed incomes is matched with the schools'
needs for a variety of services that might otherwise not be
provided. And, as Robert Putnam suggests in Bowling

130 Madelyn Pennino, Young and old, learning-Retireestutor at

school's 'lab', INTELLIGENCER J., Jan. 28, 2008, at B 1; Dena Pauling,
Seniors Who Volunteer May Get $500 Tax Break, Aging Homeowners
Could be Paidfor Work, CENTRE DAILY TIMES, Sept. 16, 200, at 1.
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Alone, the direct engagement of these citizens provides
31
value in a way that mere check-writing cannot. 1
IV.

RECURRENT COMMUNITARIAN THEMES.

We can no longer delude ourselves with sugarcoated facts, "painless" solutions, or other blue-smoke-andmirrors exercises, nor will the old partisan rhetoric or "left
versus right" labels suffice. Instead, we must begin to
consider the role of government with maturity and honesty.
Throughout this essay, we have encountered a number of
communitarian themes that can help us address this issue in
a principled manner, unencumbered by conventional political rhetoric or alignments. 132 They may be summarized as
follows:
A.

How much government?

This essay opened with the sad examples of Katrina
and Chernobyl, because they demonstrate the unfortunate
results that can be obtained from two extreme philosophies
of government: that of too much and of not enough government. We must ask: How much government is enough?
To what purposes is government legitimately and most
effectively employed? At what point does government
intervention intrude too dearly on civil liberties? When is
economic development and human progress best left to
private enterprise?
131See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND RE-

VIVAL OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

116 (2000).

Using new language to confront problems can free us from doctrinal
rhetoric and ancient commitments, but it can be disturbing to those who
seek comfort in familiar labels. George Gershwin's masterpiece, Porgy
and Bess, confounded critics, because they did not know how to characterize a unique operatic composition for the Broadway stage about
African-Americans by a Jewish-American composer of popular music
and show tunes.
132
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Traditionally, this inquiry has been framed as a tension between individual liberties and public welfare, with
the implication that whatever balance we strike, we are
dealing with a zero-sum game. Politically, this tension
often reduces to a superficial left/right struggle, with those
on the left generally arguing for greater government intervention to promote the general welfare and those on the
right suggesting that overall welfare is best advanced by
limiting state intervention and maximizing individual liberty and initiative. When the discussion turns to national
defense and security issues, however, the roles are, more
often than not, reversed in American political discourse,
with conservatives tending to defer to government prerogatives to promote security for all and liberals suggesting, as
Benjamin Franklin did, that "Tho[s]e who would give up
ESSENTIAL LIBERTY to purcha[s]e a little TEMPORARY
33
SAFETY, de[s]erve neither LIBERTY nor SAFETY." 1
As a general philosophy, communitarians reject
both the extremes of radical individualism and repressive
authoritarianism. In the words of Amitai Etzioni, the
communitarian movement's founder, "A Communitarian
perspective recognizes both individual human dignity and
the social dimension of human existence." 134 Thus, while
government power is to be constrained by individual civil
liberties, government is nevertheless respected as a vehicle
(but not the exclusive vehicle) for social organization, as is
the need for some government intrusion in furtherance of
the greater good, be it in the form of taxes, military conscription, economic regulation or, where warranted,
searches of private persons and property. While government is neither the exclusive nor even necessarily the best
means of promoting social welfare, communitarians recog133See ROBERT JACKSON, AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759)

(quotation appears

on the title page and is widely attributed to Ben Franklin).
134 AMITAI ETZIONI, supra note 118, at 253.
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nize that it plays an essential role in this endeavor. In this
regard, communitarians do not feel obliged to adhere to the
political orthodoxies of the left or the right. And while
most communitarians would assert that all persons possess
certain natural rights, we recognize that most conflict situations call for a mutual adjustment of interests, rather
than a
35
contest as to whose rights trump those of others. 1
A communitarian view calls for neither government
abdication nor totalitarianism. At certain times and with
respect to certain ventures, government plays a necessary
and critical role, be it contending with a major hurricane,
defending the nation against terrorism, or educating our
young people. Sometimes it takes a village-or a state, or
a nation-to perform tasks essential to sustained existence
and development. The quandary is in determining just how
much government intervention is necessary to create opportunities for individuals to thrive, without stifling the initiative of those same individuals. Across-the-board bromides
and political sloganeering do us little good here. Rather, a
healthy dose of pragmatism is in order. Delineating the
limits of government intervention and responsibility, consistent with notions of communitarianism, is a core inquiry
necessary to the resolution of a multitude of problems we
face in a changing world.
B.

How much law?

An issue closely related to that of the extent of government intervention is how much law is needed to describe the parameters of that intervention. Our agenda will
sometimes require structural reforms or other legislation.
Universal health insurance and environmental regulation
(including even market-based regulation, such as a carbon
tax) require statutory measures to take hold. Many such
reforms, because of the complexity of the problems they
135 GLENDON, supra note

114, at 18-19.
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seek to address, will additionally require administrative
regulations for their implementation. Congress may enact a
carbon tax and might even include in such legislation a rate
of taxation, but it would remain for an administrative agency to determine how much carbon, subject to the tax, is
emitted from any given activity (or at least determine a way
of measuring it). Because many of our adjustments are
subtle, the scalpel will sometimes be more effective than
the meat cleaver. Garrett Hardin said several decades ago,
"Prohibition is easy to legislate (though not necessarily to
enforce); but how do we legislate temperance? Experience
indicates that it can be accomplished
best through the med36
iation of administrative law." 1
But as Hardin acknowledged, administrative law "is
rightly feared for an ancient reason-Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?-'Who shall watch the watchers themselves? ' '" 137 Indeed, more often than not, taking responsibility requires not more law, but more responsible
administration of existing law. Hardin continued, "The
great challenge facing us now is to invent the corrective
feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians honest. We
must find ways to legitimate the needed authority of both
' 38
the custodians and the corrective feedbacks."'
Ultimately, more responsible administration of existing law will occur only through the active engagement of
the citizenry. Congress can enact a ban on budgetary earmarks; it can just as easily revoke the ban. 139 Congress can
create FEMA to respond to disasters; it can also continue to
confirm the appointment of inept FEMA directors. A vigi136

Hardin, supra note 125, at 1246.

137 d. at
13

1 Id.

1245-46.

at 1246.

139 Apparently, divided government in and of itself does not guaranty

prudence. A supposedly reform-minded Democratic Congress, purportedly committed to eliminating earmarks, nevertheless managed to
insert a few into its first budget in 2007. Robert Pear, Select Hospitals
Reap a Windfall Under Child Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at Al.
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lant public, aided by the press, is the best insurance against
lapses in official morality and competence. In this regard,
the solution is more often political rather than legal.
A generation of Americans (and in particular,
American lawyers) has seen how the courts in dramatic
cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education,14 1 have effected major transitions in society. As a consequence,
many of us have adopted a post-Brown mentality, in which
recourse to reformist litigation is seen as a cure-all for the
nation's ills. We should continue to avail ourselves of the
courts and the Constitution to preserve human rights. The
rights secured under Brown were critical to a nation that
needed to rid itself of the oppression of an apartheid system. But breakthrough cases like Brown, signaling a major
reordering of society, come by about once in a lifetime.
When the debate is more appropriately framed as an adjustment of interests, rather than as a competition among
rights, the political process, rather than the judicial process,
becomes the proper forum for decision-making. No writ of
mandamus will make Michael Brown a competent FEMA
Director; no judicial directive will craft a wise foreign
policy. The Supreme Court might declare the regulation of
greenhouse gases within EPA jurisdiction, 141 but the EPA
must still carry out the Court's mandate. Judicial and legislative remedies can take us only so far. The body politic
must demand more of its elected and appointed employees.
C.

The role of civil society.

Perhaps equally important as government to the
building and sustaining of community is the role of private
organizations and institutions. What political scientists call
"civil society"-a tapestry of voluntary associations such
as civic clubs, neighborhood organizations, corporations,
140 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141Massachusetts v. EPA,

127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
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labor unions, religious institutions, charitable organizations,

educational institutions, and even Putnam's bowling leagues-plays a vital role in creating and maintaining the
social capital that allows societies to thrive. Sometimes
(and in some societies), these organizations stand in opposition to government authority, but in democracies, these
organizations usually act in tandem with government, as
mediating elements through which individuals join together
for social or economic action. "[C]ivil society [is] the
space between the individual and the state, the area where

private institutions, voluntary associations, free markets,
the free expression of ideas, and the free exercise of religion can be imagined or realized." 142 Voluntary and autonomous organizations "not only mediate between the
individual and the state, ... they also help make the 'life of
' 143
a society more full, rich, and varied."'

In his book, Better Together, Robert Putnam documents the efforts of a variety of community organizations
to improve the lot of the citizenry. 144 The organizations are
engaged in a variety of efforts: economic development,
neighborhood improvement, and literacy, to name a few.
For the most part, they involve grass-roots structures, organizations built from the ground up to deal with an identified problem or serve an identified clientele. While few of
these organizations are government agencies per se, almost
all of them use government as a means of advancing their
mission. While in some regimes, civil society must act as a
"parallel polis," in opposition to the state (e.g., the Solidarity movement in Communist Poland), that need not be the
case in a democracy. "The civil society does not act in
opposition to the democratic state, but cooperates with
142
W. Robert Connor, The Idea of a Civil Society, Conference Introduction
2 (National Humanities Center 1992).
143
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Anne Firor Scott).
'44 ROBERT PUTNAM, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN

COMMUNIrrY (2003).
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it."' 145 Even in a democracy, however, civil society can
play a useful monitoring function. We should consider
how civil society may complement or supplant government
with respect to certain activities, recognizing that many
functions are best performed by voluntary associations that
lack some of the constraints, as well as the coercive power,
of government.
D.

What level ofgovernment should intervene?

When government intervention is appropriate, at
what level should it intervene? As a general proposition,
communitarians would advocate government intervention
and regulation by the smallest governmental unit and at the
most local level possible. 146 The smallest governmental
units are most likely to be most responsive to immediate
needs and most likely to invoke the direct participation of
the individuals involved, thus wedding responsive government to individual responsibility. We should be wary of
those projects (like Alaska's Bridge to Nowhere) conceived
to meet purely local "needs" but which the locals are unwilling to fund on their own. 147 But some needs (the most
obvious of which is national defense) are so overwhelming
and universal so as to require governmental response on a
larger, more national scale. Some needs are intermediate in
nature. Should the federal government respond to a hurricane that has displaced thousands, or should the people of
New Orleans, or St. Charles Parish, or Louisiana, or Mississippi be left to respond on their own? What are the geo145Bronislaw

Geremek, Civil Society and the PresentAge, in THE IDEA
OF A CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 18 (1992), availableat
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/publications/civilsoc/geremek.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
46 ETZIONI, supra note 118.

147 We should differentiate between such projects and those essential
functions such as education that address national needs but which some
localities are unable to fully fund.
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graphic dimensions of our "community"? Do they change
depending upon the circumstances addressed and the type
of intervention required? Does geography remain essential,
or is it even relevant to our definition of community in an
age of jet travel and electronic communications?
In the United States and some other countries, the
issue of the appropriate level of government response is
complicated by the principle of federalism, in which certain
entities (most notably, states and Indian tribes) are sovereigns with powers derived from sources other than the
central government. An American state or (to cite another
federal republic) German Land stands in a different relationship to the central authority in Washington or Berlin
than a French department or Chinese province has with
respect to Paris or Beijing. Does it make sense to regard
political subdivisions as sovereign units, or is this a matter
that should have been resolved definitively in the American
Civil War? Is a matter like public education (to cite just
one important example) a responsibility of each locality (as
in most of the United States), or is it regarded as a responsibility of the much larger community embodied in the state
(as in France)?
E.

Individualresponsibility.

A fifth communitarian theme of interest to us is that
of personal versus institutional responsibility. Some activities justify government intervention and regulation; with
respect to others, we are better off taking responsibility for
ourselves. Should the government regulate, for example,
the extraction of natural resources from environmentally
fragile lands, or should we leave it to the judgment and
altruism of corporations engaged in the exploitation of nonrenewable mineral resources to serve as stewards of the
environment? Should the government regulate the marketing of junk food to toddlers (as the New York Times advo-
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cated in a 2006 editorial1 48), or should we leave it to parents
to act responsibly and monitor the dietary intake of their
children? Must the State of California subsidize protection
from mudslides for coastal communities, or should people
be left to decide whether they will themselves pay the price
of living in a dangerous environment (through exposure to
danger or the cost of protection), while enjoying the benefits of an ocean view? Reasonable people will disagree
about these issues; in the very least, we should try to develop a framework for their principled consideration, rather
than defaulting to "squeaky-wheel-gets-the-grease" nostrums.
As a point of departure, I would suggest that the
case for individual, rather than collective, responsibility is
inversely correlated to the impact of one's conduct on others. The dietary intake of one's children, for example, has
an impact that is far more localized than that of drilling for
oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Common sense,
as well as respect for individual liberties, suggests that
certain decisions-and the responsibility that goes with
them-should be the province of the smallest community
unit, the family. But that does not grant us license to ignore
the sufferings of others or the interconnectedness of humanity. A broad range of human concerns demands our
engagement. We can isolate ourselves from neither genocide in Darfur nor the implications of global climate
change.
F.

Responsible intervention.

A related theme is the government's need to act
responsibly on our collective behalf. I have alluded earlier
to the problem of resorting to "painless" solutions to public
problems, like the accumulation of a growing amount of
148

Editorial, Selling Junk Food to Toddlers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,

2006, at A26.
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public debt in lieu of raising taxes. These solutions are
really not painless at all, as they merely postpone the day of
reckoning and force members of the next generation to pay
for commitments their parents have made. Even those of
us who are so cautious as to minimize our personal debt
(more and more a rarity in our debt-obsessed culture) are
forced to take on our share of the public debt. Pay-as-yougo strategies, on the other hand, have the additional benefit
of requiring the decision-maker to count the cost. 149 If a
war (on Iraq or on poverty) is not worth paying for, is it
really worth fighting? 150
Related to this inquiry is that of internalization of
costs. With respect to both public and private courses of
action, is it possible to internalize costs in such a way that
the actors pay the full price of their activities, including the
costs they might impose on others in the absence of regulation? For example, might Americans become more prudent
in their consumption of non-renewable, carbon-based fuels,
and more frequently avail themselves of public transportation, if the environmental costs of driving were fully incorporated into the cost of gasoline? Market-based solutions,
such as the carbon tax, promote responsible decisionmaking by making actors-be they individuals, corporate
bodies, or governments-count the costs. The role of government here becomes the proper assessment and enforcement of the true costs of carbon use and emissions, so as to
eliminate the freeloader phenomenon that occurs when

149

The same case can be made for localization of decision making, and

the funding necessary to support it. If the potential users of an Alaskan

bridge-to-nowhere are unwilling to pay for it, why should Washington?
150 The "other people's money" problem discussed in the preceding
note finds its analogy in the war-making context, specifically the expenditure of other people's lives. If we make war, we should be willing

to place our own lives at risk, not just those of the poor.
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people are allowed
to impose costs on others without pay151
freight.
the
ing
G.

Regardfor long-term consequences.

A corollary to the theme of responsibility is due regard for the long-term consequences of one's actions, be
they private or public. While little of the communitarian
literature to date has focused on this theme, its relationship
to communitarianism is apparent. The following acts are
among those consistent with the theme of responsibility: to
pay one's own debts, to clean up one's own messes, and to
leave one's surroundings for the better, not the worse, for
one's having been here. Annual federal budget deficits
mean that someone else will have to pay for today's felt
necessities. Economic stimulants and foreign adventures
may be priorities, but previous generations fought two
world wars and a depression during the first half of the
twentieth century without encumbering us with a fraction
of the debt we now propose to pass on to our heirs. Environmental responsibility may be of even greater importance, as the effects of environmental degradation can be
permanent in ways that deficits need not be. We cannot
dredge the Mississippi, mine the canyon lands of Utah, fill
the air with hydrocarbons, or contribute to the demise of
hundreds of other species without contemplating the consequences. The old Native American saying holds true: The
land is not a gift from our ancestors; it is a loan from our
children.
Al Gore (who has long warned about the peril of
global warming) has suggested that "[w]hat changed in the
Government does this with regularity through the tort liability system by making the courts available to people for redress against those
who have harmed them A carbon tax is a superior device in that it
carries with it a formulaic consistency and fairness not associated with
jury verdicts. It should incorporate the cost of resource depletion as
well as the cost of pollution.
151
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U.S. with Hurricane Katrina was a feeling that we have
entered a period of consequences." 1 52 But public responsibility for large-scale consequences has always been a more
difficult concept to embrace than that of individual responsibility. Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the politics
of the day is the failure to account for the future consequences of present-day policy. We plunge trillions of dollars into debt, mortgaging our children's future to the
central banks of East Asia. We turn a blind eye toward
global warming, ascribing the threat to "junk science." We
commence a war on Iraq, declaring "mission accomplished," without contemplating the difficult occupation
that lies ahead.
What the first President Bush derisively referred to
as "the vision thing" may be the greatest deficit in current
formulations of public policy. Critics of the second Bush
Administration's environmental policies suggest that its
links to corporate America have caused it to place greed
above the common good. 153 But it may not be so much that
Bush and his loyalists are greedy; they may simply lack the
foresight to comprehend the long-term consequences of
their actions. During the Reagan Administration, Interior
Secretary James Watt's seeming disregard for the environment was attributed (probably unfairly) to an apocalyptic
vision: the long-term prospects for the environment were
thought to be of no consequence, because the physical
environment was about to be destroyed by the hand of
God. 154 An other-worldly view of things may similarly
affect current policies.

(Paramount Classics 2006).

152AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH
153See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: How

GEORGE W. BUSH AND His CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE

COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY 190-99 (2004); PHILLIPS,
supra note 110.
15See Phillips, supra note 110 at 63. Phillips suggests that Watt's

concern about an imminent Second Coming justified, in his mind,
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Alternatively, the lack of vision may have more
mundane explanations. The problem with the Katrina response may have been similar to the recurring complaint
about the Pentagon-that our generals are always fighting
the last battle. In the post-9/11 period, the government
installed a vast and inconvenient security apparatus to protect the homeland from the last threat-that of terrorists
flying airplanes into skyscrapers-and neglected the next
one-an environmental calamity, caused by terrorists or
natural causes. Mother Nature may have treated us to Katrina; the poisoning of urban drinking water or the unleashing of a "dirty bomb" in some major metropolitan area may
be the next surprise Al-Qaeda has cooked up for us. Indeed, people are working on this critical issue, but it does
not appear that our government has attached
the urgency or
155
deserves.
it
that
issue
the
to
resources
It is not as if the party out of power excels at longterm planning. If the Republicans have a time horizon of
about one month, the Democrats often seem to have a horizon of seventy-five years-into the past. But efforts to
depart from this mind-set have produced mixed results.
Over a decade ago, in an effort to fashion a "third way,"
Clinton-era Democrats joined market-minded Republicans
in rejecting protectionism and embracing free trade. But by
failing to insist that our trading partners adopt measures to
protect labor and the environment, we may have placed our
own industries and workers at a disadvantage while exacerbating environmental degradation and exploitation of labor
in other parts of the world.
The traditional liberal nostrums of redistribution
and regulation have merit in some circumstances. Vast and
better stewardship of natural resources in anticipation of that reckoning.

See Steve Coil, The Unthinkable: Can the UnitedStates Be Made
Safe from Nuclear Terrorism?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2007, at
48.
155

68

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

69

still-growing disparities in wealth (and access to it) may
justify the former, and environmental imperatives may
require the latter. Not all solutions can be market-based.
But solutions that internalize externalities (e.g., by using a
carbon tax to incorporate environmental costs into prices)
may produce the most efficient results and remain largely
untried. Such solutions combine the best elements of the
with markets and the liberal infatuaconservative obsession
156
regulation.
tion with
The Dutch polder experience in the years following
World War II demonstrates how disparate political parties,
religious groups, and economic interests can unite for the
common good and address pressing needs. We must recognize that current security, environmental, and fiscal demands are, like those that demanded the Dutch polder
effort, an existential matter. To confront these demands, a
new politics of community and responsibility must replace
the old partisan bickering. As Lincoln said in another era,
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to
the stormy present. The occasion is piled high
with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think

156

CompareClean Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as

passed by House), and Renewable Fuels, Consumer Protection, and
Energy Efficiency Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (as

amended and passed by Senate) (encompassing a variety of regulatory
measures, such as more stringent automobile mileage regulations), with
Robert B. Reich, The Best Ideafor Reducing Global Warming, THE
AM. PROSPECT, June 20, 2007, availableat

http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article--the-best-idea-for-reducing
__global-warming_ (advocating cap-and-trade approach), and Interview

by Scott Jagow with Robert Reich, Professor of Public Policy at the
University of California at Berkley (June 20, 2007) (advocating carbon
tax).
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anew and act anew. We must disenthrall157ourselves, and then we shall save our country.
H.

Being a good neighbor.

The final communitarian theme we should address
is the importance of behaving as good neighbors. Being a
good neighbor means more than conforming to that which
is legally required. A focus on legal rights alone ignores
the informal relationships and voluntary undertakings that
are essential to the societal fabric. "Buried deep in our
rights dialect," writes communitarian Mary Ann Glendon,
"is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land
of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations
toward others except to avoid the active infliction of
harm." 158 It would be a sad land indeed if we regarded our
obligations to others as merely congruent with our legal
obligations and failed to recognize our interdependence.
Compare, if you will, the defensive, fearful post-Katrina
response of the officials of Gretna, Louisiana (who barred
dislocated New Orleans residents from their streets) with
that of their counterparts in Houston, Texas. By opening
their public facilities, their schools, and their arms to those
displaced by Katrina, Houston's citizens may have momentarily diluted their material resources, but they built a priceless store of social capital from which they are likely to
reap returns for years to come.
The same notion of "neighborliness" may be attached to international affairs. In his recent book, From
Empire to Community, Amitai Etzioni envisions a transition
from a "might makes right" philosophy in foreign relations
to the development of institutions and communal bonds to

157Abraham

Lincoln, The President's State of the Union Address to
Congress (Dec. 1, 1862).
158GLENDON, supra note 114, at 77.

70

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

71

establish human primacy. 159 Gunboat diplomacy and
bombing raids may provide temporary gains, but in an age
of global terrorism, real security is obtained only through
collaboration.
Determining the parameters of effective government action, recognizing both the potency and limitations
of law, delineating the boundary between public and private, defining the role of civil society, discerning the respective roles of governments at different levels, acting
responsibly, planning for the future, and caring for our
neighbors: these are considerations that can frame principled discussion. As events from Chernobyl to Katrina
have demonstrated, these issues are too important to be
dispatched with familiar labels or partisan rhetoric. We
must honestly acknowledge inconvenient facts, engage in
principled discourse, and recognize that our future depends
on a web of relationships and the enlightened employment
of governance mechanisms.
To some, the principles suggested in this essay will
appear naive. Self-interest dominates human endeavor, the
public-choice theorists would say, and to profess otherwise
is wishful thinking worthy only of Pollyanna or Candide.
Government can never be trusted, the cynics warn us. But
disaster lies in the unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, just
as surely as it lies in the unfettered power of government.
The consequences of heedless pursuit of selfish ends at one
extreme, or of forfeiture of all initiative to government at
the other, are too dire, and furnish no realistic vision of a
livable future. Better for us to seek a proper balance, to
build community, and to trust what Lincoln called "the
60
better angels of our nature."'

159 AM1TAI ETZIONI, FROM EMPIRE TO COMMUNrrYpassim (2004).
160

Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
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OPINION PIECE

REFORMING EMINENT DOMAIN IN TENNESSEE
AFTER KELO: SAFEGUARDING THE FAMILY FARM
Beau Pemberton*
Introduction
Take a journey back in time to the summer of 2005.
Visualize a seventy-five year old, widowed grandmother

living on her farm in rural Middle Tennessee. This thirtyacre farm in the middle of the county is all that she has left
to call her own. The world has grown around her farm for
many years, inviting mini-malls, restaurants, condominiums, and interstate ramps on all sides of this picturesque
setting. Now, imagine the grandmother's shock when she
receives a letter from the local Economic Development
Board notifying her that it is going to condemn her property
via eminent domain as part of the county's Master Economic Redevelopment Plan.
The letter states that her land will serve as the relocation site for a major automobile manufacturer, which will
bring eight hundred new jobs and nearly $2 million a year
in new tax revenues to the economically distressed county.
This redevelopment plan provides the public purpose that
justifies taking the land by eminent domain. Developers'
attractive monetary offers caused her former neighbors to
sell out and move away, but because the grandmother had
* J.D. candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, graduating in
May, 2008, with a Concentration in Business Transactions; B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2005, The University of Tennessee at Martin. The
author would like to thank Dr. Otis Stephens, and his assistants, for
their invaluable guidance and input on this essay. The author dedicates
this essay to his wife, Stacey, and daughter, Sarah Elizabeth, and expresses his thanks for their support and patience while writing this
piece.
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emotional ties to the property, she was determined to spend
the rest of her life on her farm. She was hardly reassured
by the promise that she would receive just compensation
for her taken property.
After recovering from the initial shock of the letter,
she visits her lawyer to determine her options. The lawyer
tells her that little can be done to stop the taking of her land
for this economic redevelopment plan or to stop the bulldozers that will make way for the new automobile factory.
Her only realistic recourse is to litigate over the amount of
money she will receive for her land and for the resulting
displacement from her home. This news is cold comfort to
her because it means that she will be forced to live out her
days somewhere else.
The above described scenario is similar to the experience of property owners in New London, Connecticut.
Their challenge to the taking of their property for economic
redevelopment purposes led to the 2005 landmark decision,
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and
resulted in a ripple effect that is currently reforming eminent domain law throughout the United States. To appreciate how Kelo has affected Tennessee's eminent domain
law, the decision must be examined in detail.
Kelo v. City of New London's Facts
The Kelo litigation began when Susette Kelo, as
well as several of her neighbors in the Fort Trumbull area
of New London, Connecticut, challenged the taking of their
property under an economic redevelopment plan (Plan)
implemented by New London Development Corporation
(NLDC) and the City of New London (City).' The Plan's
original purposes were "to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to
increase tax.. . revenues, and to revitalize an economically

1Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
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distressed city."' 2

Several factors encouraged this Plan
including (1) the 1996 closing of the United States Government's Naval Undersea Warfare Center, located in the
Fort Trumbull area; (2) a city unemployment rate double of
that for all of Connecticut; and (3) a decreased city population.3 The Plan intended to use the taken property for "the
creation of a Fort Trumbull State Park" on the former site
of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center; a $300 million
research facility for Pfizer, Inc., adjacent to the park; land
for a new Coast Guard Museum; and property set aside for
residential, commercial, retail, parking, and other purpos4
es.
During the Plan's initial stages, NLDC hosted a "series of neighborhood meetings to educate the public about
the process"' 5 and eventually won approval from state officials who determined that the plan "was consistent with
relevant state and municipal development policies." 6 After
state approval, NLDC finalized the Plan by focusing on a
ninety-acre tract in the Fort Trumbull area of New London. 7 In January 2000, New London's city council approved the Plan's final version and authorized NLDC to
acquire the Fort Trumbull property by purchase or by eminent domain. 8 After purchase negotiations with Susette

2

Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
4Id. at 473-74. The Court notes that NLDC was attempting to capitalize on Pfizer's new research facility as a catalyst to meet the redevelopment plan's original purposes of creating newjobs, tax revenues,
and New London's eventual revitalization. Id. at 473.
5
Id. at 473.
6 Id. at 473-74 n.2. Given the nature of this case, I wonder just how
effective the public meetings held by NLDC were at addressing concems of the affected landowners.
7
1d. at 474.
8
ld. at 475.
3
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Kelo and her neighbors failed, NLDC initiated proceedings
to take their property by eminent domain. 9
After the eminent domain declaration by NLDC,
Kelo and several of her neighbors filed an action against
NLDC in state court and alleged that the taking was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution because the taking violated the Fifth
Amendment's "'public use' restriction."'"
NLDC then
announced that it would enter into leasing agreements with
private companies, including Corcoran Jennison, to develop
the property.11 This arrangement appeared to be a harmless
way to meet the Plan's goals, but it essentially condemned
private land for the benefit of private individuals and developers. This arrangement strengthened the petitioner's
argument because the authors of the Fifth Amendment
presumably did not envision the taking of private land for
private use.
After a bench trial before the New London Superior
Court, the petitioners obtained a permanent restraining
order to prevent the taking of Parcel 4-A, but they lost
regarding Parcel 3.12 The petitioners appealed this incomplete victory to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
sustained all the takings at issue. 13 First, the court upheld
the takings on statutory grounds, noting that the state's
9 d. Specifically, petitioners owned a total of fifteen properties in the
Fort Trumbull area, with four of the properties located in Parcel 3 of
the Plan, immediately north of the proposed Pfizer facility and eleven
of the properties located in Parcel 4-A of the Plan. Id. at 474. Parcel 3
was slated for office space, and Parcel 4-A was slated for a park or
manna usage. Id. at 476.
'01Id.at 475.
1
1d. at 476 n.4.
Id. at 475-76. The Court notes that this trial on the proposed takings
was a bench trial, which raises the question: Why did the petitioners not
demand a jury trial regarding the proposed takings because a jury
would likely have been more sympathetic to a landowner's concerns
than a governmental agency's plan? See id. at 475.
1Id. at 476.
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municipal development code expressed a clear legislative
determination that land taken for economic redevelopment,
regardless of whether it is developed, is still "a 'public use'
and in the 'public interest."' ' 14 Next, the court, adhering to
federal precedent, sustained the takings for the Plan's pronounced public use. 15 Finally, the court analyzed whether
the takings were "'reasonably necessary' to achieving the
City's intended public use" and "whether the takings were
for 'reasonably foreseeable needs."" 6 This analysis produced a mixed result.
The three dissenting justices discussed the City's
failure to adduce evidence of future economic benefits
flowing from the Plan and the proposed takings. 17 The
dissent maintained that this lack of evidence should have
invalidated all of NLDC's takings as unconstitutional, despite the Plan's intent "to serve a valid public use."" The
dissenting justices stated that a "'heightened' standard of..
review" was needed to evaluate these takings because
they were purely for economic redevelopment instead of
the typical eminent domain purposes (e.g. roads or parks). 19
Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
observed that the main issue was "whether a city's decision
to take property for ...economic development satisfies"
20
the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.

14 id.

15Id.(citing Haw. Hous.Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ber-

man
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
16
See id.
17Id.at 477.
18id.
19

Id.

20 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V,

§ 1 ("[N]or shall private proper-

ty be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
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The State of the Law before Kelo v. City of New London
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Kelo
is by no means a groundbreaking decision. For several
decades, the Court has maintained that whether a taking
satisfies the Fifth Amendment's public purpose requirement requires deference to legislative judgments governing
this area. 2 1 The first landmark case in this area was Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26 (1954), which the Court handed
down over fifty years ago. 22 Berman dealt with a redevelopment plan in Washington, D.C., and the plan for this
"blighted area" condemned the existing structures, including Berman's department store, to make way for roads,
schools, and other public structures. 2 3 The rest of the condemned property was leased back to private parties for
24
further development, including low-income housing.
Berman parallels Kelo in that the petitioner challenged the
taking as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause because another private party would eventually
control and redevelop the taken property.2 5
The Court's unanimous decision deferred to legislative determinations on what constituted a valid public use
under the Fifth Amendment. 26
The Court, speaking
through Justice William 0. Douglas, stated that it had no
right to overrule a public use determination because "Con21 Kelo,

545 U.S. at 483.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 26 (1954).
23
1Id. at 28-31.
24
Id. This redevelopment plan arose "under the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act of 1945," which sought to eliminate blighted and
slum residential areas of the District as a way of fostering new and
publicly acceptable development. Id. at 28.
5Id. at 31. Petitioner contended that taking his purely commercial
property (i.e. a department store) was inconsistent with the plan's stated
purpose of "ridding the area" of residential slum property and that
creating a "better balanced, more attractive community" is not a valid
public purpose to sustain the Act. Id.
Id. at 33.
22
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gress and its authorized agencies" had decided that this
redevelopment plan met several, well-established public
purposes, consistent with its police power function. 27 Furthermore, the Court refused to dictate "the means of executing the [plan]" and noted that the plan's execution was
within the sole discretion of the legislature, including the
use of private enterprise for implementing the plan.28 Berman should have been instructive to the Kelo petitioners
because both cases involved takings for public29 uses that
were less concrete than in a typical takings case.
Next, the Court discussed Hawaii HousingAuthority v. Midkff, 469 U.S. 229 (1984), a landmark takings decision. Midkiff focused on the constitutionality of the
Hawaiian government condemning and taking residential
rental property from private landlords and transferring fee
30
simple title to the existing lessee living on the property.
The public purpose of Hawaii's law, titled the Land Reform
Act of 1967, was to break up the property oligopoly of a
relatively small number of individual landowners in Hawaii. 31 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the statute was "a naked attempt ... of Hawaii

27 Id. at 32-35.

Id. at 33-34 ("We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment
?rojects.").

For example, a typical takings case would likely involve the appropriation of private land for a tangible public good, such as an interstate or
a post office. Berman's redevelopment plan, which included concrete
elements such as streets and parks as part of its public purpose, also
included less tangible and arguably more abstract elements such as
"prevent[ing], reduce[ing], or eliminate[ing] ... blight." Id. at 29.
Kelo's Plan followed a similar path because its public purposes included parks and other public facilities and increased tax revenues and

economic revitalization. See Kelo v.City of New London, 545 U.S.
469,
474 (2005).
30
31

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
Id. at 232-33.
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to take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely
32
for B's private use and benefit."
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that
"[t]he 'public use' requirement is. . . coterminous with the
scope of a sovereign's police powers" and that redistributing land and effectively eliminating an undesirable land
oligopoly via a compensated taking is clearly within a
33
state's police power justifying the use of eminent domain.
The Court maintained that its role of reviewing legislative
determinations of public use was "'an extremely narrow'
one." 34 Reaffirming prior decisions, the Court stated that it
would not substitute its judgment for legislative determinations of a public use "'unless the use [is] palpably without
reasonable foundation."' 35 The Court asserted that its focus
was not on the end-result behind the taking, but strictly on
the plan's public purpose for the takings and whether the
means for the plan's execution were rational.36
In closing, the Court reiterated its position that the
Fifth Amendment does not impose "any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general
public." 37 Specifically, the Court stated, "It is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion,.., directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in
order [for it] to constitute a public use." 38 In short, the
Court determined that the Hawaii statute, which utilized

32 Id. at

235.

33

Id. at 240-42.
Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
35
Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160
U.S.
668, 680 (1896)); see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-35.
36
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43. In addition, the Court stated that debating the wisdom of takings legislation and its attending public purposes
is improper in the federal courts.
37
Id. at 244.
38
34

Id. (quoting Rindge Co. v. L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923)).
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eminent 3 9domain, "pass[es] scrutiny of the Public Use
Clause."
In essence, both Berman and Midkiff set a deferentone
for the Court's review in takings cases when extial
amining what constitutes a valid public use. The Kelo
Court, following this deferential tone, abandoned any idea
that the stated legislative purposes behind eminent domain4
0
takings are simply post hoc rationalizations of the taking.
Interestingly, both Berman and Midkiff provide considerable latitude to the possibility of private owners becoming
both the end-users and owners of property taken from their
neighbors by eminent domain.
These cases demonstrate that Kelo is not earthshattering takings jurisprudence, despite two decades separating Midkiff and Kelo and over fifty years dividing Berman and Kelo. The effects of Kelo have been aggrandized
because of an age in which newspapers, twenty-four hour
news channels, and internet news websites report and often
sensationalize stories, including United States Supreme
Court decisions. 4 1 The majority opinion in Kelo, while not
jurisprudentially novel, follows the past decisions of Berman and Midkiff by holding that the taking of the petition-

39
40

d. at 243.
See Brief for the States of Vermont et. al. as Amici Curiae Support-

ing Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(No. 04-108) (highlighting several states' positions, including Tennessee, that the courts should give deferential treatment to state determinations of public use in takings cases and limit interference in this area by
the federal courts. This limited influence prevents unnecessary judicial
entanglement and is established precedent in the Court's takings jurisprudence).
41See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Propertyfor
Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at Al; Assoc. Press, High
CourtExpands Reach of Eminent Domain, Fox NEWS, June 23, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly story/0,3566,160479,00.htm
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ers' land under an economic redevelopment
plan was con42
stitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
Analyzing the Kelo Decision
After writing the majority opinion in Kelo, Justice
John Paul Stevens attempted to set himself apart from the
decision, calling the outcome "unwise," but qualifying his
statement by adding that "the law compelled a result that
[he] would have opposed if [he] were a legislator." 43 Despite Justice Stevens' misgivings, his majority opinion
began by emphasizing the Court's limited scope of review
and deference to legislative determinations of public use for
eminent domain. 44 The Court determined that the Plan at
issue "unquestionably serves a public purpose," thereby'
meeting the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.
Specifically, the Court stated that "[p]romoting economic
development is a [longstanding objective] of government"
and that "there is . . . no other principled way of distinguishing economic development from . . . other public
purposes." 46 The Court explained that holding the benefits
derived from NLDC's Plan as an invalid public use would
be "incongruous" from its prior takings jurisprudence.47
Aside from sustaining NLDC's takings as constitutional, the Court refused to adopt the petitioner's proposed
bright-line rule that would automatically invalidate eco42

See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005). The

majority included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kennedy. Id. at 470.

Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (DutyPrevails),
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
44
45Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83.
43

1 d.

at 484. (noting that other factors justifying the validity of their
result, including extensive deliberation prior to the Plan's adoption and
statutory
authorization for this Plan in Connecticut).
46
Id. at 484.
47
1d. at 485; see, e.g., Berman v.Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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nomic development as a public use. 48 Thus, the Kelo ma-

jority rejected the petitioner's contention that "eminent
domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the
boundary between public and private takings.",49 Again, the
Court deferred to its past jurisprudence and noted that it
"'cannot say ... public ownership is the sole method of
promoting the public purposes of

.

.

. redevelopment

projects."' 50 The majority's decision focused solely on the
Plan's purpose and its attendant takings, not the
mechanics
51
required to implement the Plan or the takings.
Essentially, the Court, through a five-person majority, openly sanctioned the ancillary private use of property
taken by eminent domain, if the public purpose behind the
taking is constitutional and if the property's development52
occurs within the parameters of a redevelopment plan.
The Framers of the Constitution likely never intended eminent domain as a mechanism to take private land for a purported (even incidental) public purpose and later allow
another private party to benefit directly from the taking.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the
deprivation of private property without due process of law
or without just compensation. 53 This opinion militates
against the Framers' intent of the Fifth Amendment, specif48

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 (noting

that
49 economic redevelopment can be a valid public use).

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
Id. at 486 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34) (emphasis added).
51See id. at 489 ("Once the question of... purpose has been decided,
the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract ... rests in the discretion of the legislative
50

branch.").
52Id. at 486-87 (noting that the Court will not examine any hypothetical
case in which a condemning authority transfers land from one private
citizen to another for the purpose of increasing the property's productivity, even though they would substantiate the petitioner's bright-line
rule prohibiting economic development as a public use).
53 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (prohibiting deprivation of a person's
property without due process of law or just compensation).

83

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

84

ically the Takings Clause, and runs contrary to the idea that
eminent domain takings should benefit all citizens.
The remainder of Kelo's majority opinion continued
the litany of deference by reiterating that legislative decisions on public use are paramount, and that the Court is an
improper forum to debate the wisdom of a taking or the
plan behind it. 54 In sum, the Court's majority validated
NLDC's Plan, the takings, and the stated public purposes
through a form of rational-basis review. 55 Not surprisingly,
Justice Stevens would be eager to distance himself from
such a broad pronouncement of power under the Takings
Clause, especially if he was a legislator.56
Compared to the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the dissenting opinions in Kelo are
more realistic.57 Justice Kennedy strongly criticized the
majority's deferential treatment of NLDC' s takings and the
stated public purposes behind them, calling them "incidental or pretextual. ' '58 Validating takings based on "incidental
or pretextual public benefits," he writes, is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. 59 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy determined that a proactive inquiry into an economic
development plan's public purpose is needed to discover
whether the benefits conferred on the private parties are
merely incidental, contrary to the usual standard of rational-basis deference. 60 Justice Kennedy concurred with the
majority that a presumptive invalidity of public purpose for
54 See Kelo,
55 Id. at 490

545 U.S. at 488-90.
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This deferential standard of

review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses...

See Greenhouse, supra note 43, at Al.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo highlights his significance as
a "swing-vote" because he voted with the majority to sustain NLDC's
56

57

taking as constitutional but also filed a separate concurrence justifying
his
decision.
58
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59

60

Id.

Id.at 491 (emphasis added).
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economic development plans is unwarranted; however, his
opinion was sage enough to advocate against a standard
that could allow for widespread takings of private land
under pretextual or incidental public purposes. 6 1 Kennedy's opinion demonstrated an apparent understanding that
legislative pronouncements on public uses often occur with
little public input or meaningful thought. 62
The Kelo decision yielded two strong dissenting
opinions by Justices O'Connor 63 and Thomas, 64 respectively. First, the O'Connor dissent, joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on the majority's essential obliteration of "any distinction between65
private and public use" under the Fifth Amendment.
Essentially, Justice O'Connor determined that the majority
opinion allows "incidental public benefits" derived from
economic redevelopment to serve the same function as a
direct public use, contrary to the Fifth Amendment's public
use clause. 66 Specifically, Justice O'Connor noted that
Berman and Midkiff, which the majority relied on, involved
a taking that conferred a direct public benefit. 67 Since direct
public benefits resulted from those takings, returning the
taken property to private individuals was inconsequential.6 s
The Court correctly sustained the takings and their public
purposes in those direct benefit cases.69 With the Kelo
takings, the lack of a direct relationship between the public
purpose of NLDC's Plan and public benefit conferred consternated the dissenting justices. As a property rights advo61 Id.

at 493.

62 Id.

at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters were Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
65 Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
64 Id.
66

id.

67 Id. at

500.

68

Id.
69
Id.
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cate, this author joins Justice O'Connor's condemnation of
the majority's permissive posture of allowing an indirect
public purpose to serve the textual and direct public purpose required by the Fifth Amendment for takings.
Justice Thomas's dissent complements Justice
O'Connor's dissent by addressing a strictly textual and
historical interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. 70 This
dissent used a detailed overview of the extensive judicial
history and precedents underlying takings cases and explained how the Court's prior takings jurisprudence has led7 1

it to the current (and arguably incorrect) result in Kelo.
Interestingly, both dissenting opinions noted that the economically poor of society will shoulder the constant threat
of having their property taken and redistributed to more
affluent and politically astute persons for redevelopment
72
under a likely incidental or pretextual "public purpose."
In short, the Kelo dissenters highlighted the majority opinion's shortcomings and warned those who read Kelo
that the Court's most recent pronouncement on takings will
impact landowners in a way never contemplated by the
Fifth Amendment. The effect of Kelo is akin to the erosion
of a hillside that will eventually cause a landslide on unsuspecting landowners. This author agrees with the dissenting
justices in using eminent domain to obtain a direct public
70

See id. at 506, 511, 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the

public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment means that the taken
private property is actually employed for a direct public good instead of
some merely conceivable public benefit (e.g. increased taxes)). This
dissent advocates a return to the plain textual meaning of the Takings
Clause, which is evidenced by Justice Thomas's dedication to strictly
construing the text, in a manner similar to Justice Hugo Black. See id.
at 523.
71 Id. at 512-18.
72 Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (specifically noting Justice Thomas's reference to the 'discrete and insular minorities"' of United States v. CaroleneProducts
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), that would be directly affected by the
majority's holding in Kelo).
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benefit and with Justice Kennedy insofar that a more indepth inquiry is needed for economic redevelopment plans
and their alleged direct public purposes under the Fifth
Amendment. Tennessee, like many other states, understood Kelo's potential impact on eminent domain and the
concerns of the dissenting justices. Under intense electoral
pressure, Tennessee changed its takings law to counteract
Kelo and its future implications.
Tennessee's Legislative Response to Kelo v. City of New
London
During the 2006 legislative session, the Tennessee
General Assembly enacted Public Chapter 863 to revise
Tennessee's eminent domain statutes. 73 In changing the
law, the General Assembly responded to constituents' demands that Tennessee revise its antiquated eminent domain
law to prevent a Kelo-type scenario from occurring. 74 Public Chapter 863 addressed several different areas, including
the legislative intent for eminent domain, the definition of
and the revision of specific eminent domain
public purpose,
75
procedures.
The Tennessee General Assembly began its statutory revisions by declaring that eminent domain should "be
used sparingly" and that a narrow construction of the eminent domain statutes was required to prevent any uninten73 See

Scott Griswold, PropertyRights vs. Public Use, TENN. B.J., Feb.

2007, at 14, 15.
74 For ease of reference, I will reference the Tennessee Code Annotated
section affected by Public Chapter 863 when discussing the changes to
Tennessee's eminent domain law.
75 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007) (stating the General
Assembly's intent on the appropriate use of eminent domain); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (defining both eminent domain
and public use for the purposes of eminent domain); See e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007) (amending the time period for
the "quick-take" procedure from five days to thirty days, among other
procedural changes enacted by Public Chapter 863).
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tional enlargement of the state's ability to take private land
for public purposes. 76 This statute is the General Assembly's statement of legislative intent for eminent domain. In
an interview with State Senator Doug Jackson, he explained that the recent changes were a reactionary response
that attempted to balance the concerns of those who feared
that Kelo would occur in Tennessee, such as the Tennessee
Farm Bureau, and those fearing that the General Assembly's response to Kelo would unduly narrow eminent domain, such as local governments. 77 Senator Jackson
estimated that Public Chapter 863 represents the final compromise between several dozen bills filed immediately after
any Kelo-type scenaKelo and should effectively prevent
78
rios from occurring in Tennessee.
Next, Public Chapter 863 attempted to define both
eminent domain and what constitutes public use for eminent domain purposes. 79 Interestingly, this aspect of Tennessee's eminent domain law was notably absent for many
years. 80 The statute first defines eminent domain as "the
authority conferred upon the government ... to condemn
and take.., private property... so long as the property is
taken for a legitimate public use." 81 Public use is then
76 TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).

77 Telephone Interview with State Sen. Doug Jackson, representing the
2 5 th Senatorial District and sponsor of S.B. 3296, the parent legislation
of Public Chapter 863 (Mar. 19, 2007).

78 id.
79 TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007); see also Griswold,
supra note 73, at 15-16.
80 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 15.
81TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007); see TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 21 ("[N]o man's particular ...property

taken, or applied to

public use... without just compensation...."). Interestingly, Section
102 states that a legitimate public use must be "in accordance with the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, the
Constitution of Tennessee, Art. 1, §21, and the provisions of chapter
863 of the Public Acts of 2006," as codified in the Tennessee Code
Annotated. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(1) (Supp. 2007).
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defined broadly and negatively as follows: "[direct] private
use or benefit, or the indirect public benefits resulting from
private economic development and private commercial
enterprise, including increased tax revenue and increased
employment opportunity" are not public uses for eminent
domain. 82 Through this language, the General Assembly
responded directly to Kelo by defining public use for eminent domain in terms of the Court's most recent pronouncement of what is acceptable as a public purpose for
taking private land.83
Aside from the public use definition, the revisions
included exceptions that permitted takings for traditional
public purposes (e.g. roads and highways); common carriers and other utilities; housing authorities or community
development agencies; and industrial parks.8 4 Another
revision in this statute provided that private property taken
pursuant to an urban renewal or redevelopment plan must
occur to eliminate a "blighted area." 85 "Blighted area" is
defined under Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-20201(a) as an "[area] (including slum areas) with buildings
or other improvements" that are detrimental to, inter alia,
the overall "welfare of the community" because of the
statutory reasons therein. 86 The statute also exempted

82TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2)
83See generally Kelo v. City of New

(Supp. 2007).
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(defining acceptable public uses for eminent domain).
84 TENN.CODE ANN.§29-17-102(2)(A)-(C), (E)
(Supp.2007).
85 Id.
at (2)(C).
86 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating
that "[w]elfare of the community does not include solely a loss of
property value to surrounding properties... [or] the need for increased
tax revenues" as sufficient justifications to deem the property blighted),
with Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494, 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
Justice O'Connor's concern of taking property so that government can
upgrade the property and get more revenue from it via taxes).
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farmland used in agricultural production from the definition
of blight.87
Despite the General Assembly's best efforts, only
judicial interpretation of this broad and vague standard of
public use will dictate its effectiveness for preventing Kelotype takings. 88 Litigious landowners can litigate the true
meaning of the broad and vague definition of blighted
area, 89 or whether a government project causing a taking is
actually conferring a direct public benefit. 90 Adverse effects on poorer neighborhoods and less affluent property
owners are likely thanks to these recent changes in the law
because they are often subjected to91redevelopment plans
similar to those in Kelo and Berman.
In addition to the obvious effects discussed above, a
concern exists that the recent changes still permit the very
mechanisms that caused Kelo: takings by economic redeve92
lopment agencies conferring only indirect public benefits.
The statute prohibits taking for private development that
has indirect public benefits as their public use justification;
however, takings by redevelopment agencies are still accepted by the revised statute. 93 These plans often include
private developers as the catalyst to fulfill the plan. This
issue causes consternation because a close reading of the
revised statute appears to leave open a possibility for
another Kelo type taking in Tennessee, despite the General
§ 1-3-105(2)(A) (Supp. 2007) (defining agriculture and agricultural uses); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp.
87 TENN. CODE ANN.

2007).
88See Griswold, supra note 73, at 17 (reaching the same prediction as
the author for these recent legislative changes).
89 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
90 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007).
91 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505, 521-22 (O'Connor and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (mirroring the same arguments of a disproportionate impact
on less affluent and prosperous people through the majority's opinion
in the case); Griswold, supra note 73, at 16-17.
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
9'Id. at (2)(C).
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Assembly's efforts to "cure" the problems caused by Kelo
and rendering the new public use definition ineffective.
Another concern arises out of the statutory revisions. Putting aside the issue of whether a taking confers a
direct public benefit, one of the public use exceptions states
that "private use that is merely incidentalto a public use" is
a permissible public use, as long as the land condemned is
not "primarily .. . [for] the incidental private use."9 4 This
exception appears to impute an intent requirement into
takings law that was previously unknown (and likely never
intended) in eminent domain.
For example, suppose a city takes thirty acres of
for
a new park. This city is economically impoveland
rished and often lacks tax revenues. When the city takes
the property through eminent domain, the city intends to
develop the park, as its stated public purpose for the taking.
Everyone knows, however, that the money will never be
there to fulfill the project. The land is held for several
years with no progress made towards the park (i.e. the public purpose for the taking). Eventually, the county sells the
condemned property to a private company that later develops the land into a new car factory, which generates new
jobs and added tax revenues. 95 The park never materializes, but the city has a new employer and revenue source.
The preceding example demonstrates that private
property can be taken for a (purported) public purpose and
later turned over to a private developer as an "incidental"
use because the primary purpose for taking the land initial94 TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-17-102(2)(D) (Supp. 2007).
§ 29-17-1003(a) (Supp. 2007) (stating

95Compare TENN. CODE ANN.

that when "land acquired by eminent domain" is subsequently disposed
of by a condemning authority "to another public or quasi-public entity
or to aprivateperson, corporation,or other entity," fair market value
for the property or better must be received by the transferor), with GA.

CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(b) (Supp. 2007) (providing that no conversion of
property "for any use other than a public use" shall take place until

twenty years after the initial taking).
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ly was a permissible public use. The private use for the
property did not arise until several years later and is merely
incidental to changing times, economics, and political
priorities. Essentially, the exception could gut the newly
enacted public use definition because an intent requirement
is superimposed on the public use definition. A governmental body can potentially take land intending it for a
public use, only to never have the means to fulfill the purpose and later sell the property off to private individuals as
an "incidental" occurrence to the taking. The transfer
would fulfill the statute's literal requirements for public
use, but would circumvent the legislative intent behind
eminent domain. Thus, this process would render the public use definition meaningless because the actual events
96
would run totally contrary to the statutory language.
Challenging takings based on this scenario would require a
showing of bad faith regarding the government's intent
behind the initial taking and subsequent property transfer to
a private individual (i.e. the proof would require that the
governmental body took private land by eminent domain
and then transferred it to another private party, knowing
that the taking's public purpose97would never materialize at
the time of the original taking).
An example of how Public Chapter 863 revised
specific eminent domain procedures is evidenced by the
revision of the "quick-take" procedure for public agency
takings. Prior to 2006, a condemning authority in Tennessee, such as the Department of Transportation, could give a
96 See TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-17-102 (Supp. 2007) (noting that these

takings of land for an intended public use, selling to a private party, and
then enjoying the indirect public benefits derived from the private
development run directly contrary to the language of indirect public
benefits caused by private developments and shall not be a public use

for eminent domain).

97

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (noting that the
petitioner's failure to demonstrate intent on the part of the government
by concrete evidence proved fatal to their case).
See, e.g.,
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landowner only five days notice before being entitled to
physical possession of the property pursuant to its power of
condemnation. 98 The revised law now requires the condemning authority to give the landowner a thirty-day notice
before taking possession of the property. 99 Based on personal work experience, the thirty-day notice requirement
benefits landowners by giving them time to plan for the
imminent condemnation and devise an appropriate response. The condemning authority also benefits because it
litigates dozens of other condemnation actions concurrently
that require an equal amount of attention. 100 Despite contentions that this added time will only delay eminent domain litigation, practitioners on both sides will likely agree
that the marginal cost is outweighed by the added benefits
of the extra time in the interest of fairness and justice.
In closing, the recent changes to Tennessee's eminent domain law will have far-reaching implications for
Tennessee practitioners. Aside from litigation over specific
procedural issues, such as how to correctly value the condemned property, broader issues dealing with a taking's
constitutionality will likely occur due to the formulation of
a more narrow and vague public use definition, including

§ 29-17-803(b) (2005). The "quick-take" procedure most often involves land acquisitions for highway right-of-ways;
however, this type of taking is one of the most common uses of eminent domain in Tennessee.
99 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-903(c) (Supp. 2007). This statute applies
98 TENN. CODE ANN.

to situations in which the private landowners are not contesting con-

demnation and the private landowners contest either the condemnation
itself or the amount of just compensation due to them for the taking.
Note that Part 8 of the statute, dealing with the "quick-take" procedure
was moved to Part 9 of the Tennessee Code following the 2006 statuto0revisions.
The author has clerked for two summers for the Tennessee Attorney
General's Office in the Real Property Division and has handled condemnation litigation for the State of Tennessee.
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what constitutes
"incidental private use" or a "blighted
10 1
area."

Tennessee's Sister States Follow the Kelo Revision
Movement
After the Court's decision in Kelo, states bordering
Tennessee have reformed their eminent domain laws in a
similar fashion. This section of this essay will briefly discuss the efforts of Kentucky, Georgia, and Alabama in
reforming eminent domain as a comparison of how Tennessee's sister states are counteracting Kelo. 10 2 This section
will compare each examined sister-state's definition of
public use, blight, legislative intent, and other notable innovations 10in
their laws to Tennessee's eminent domain
3
revisions.

Kentucky
Kentucky is the first sister state examined regarding
its post-Kelo eminent domain changes. During the 2006
legislative session, Kentucky revised its eminent domain
statute to specifically define public use and prohibit emi§ 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007) (defining acceptable public uses for eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20101See TENN. CODE ANN.

20 1(a) (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the definition of blight).

102
See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State

Legislation,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2007) (highlighting the recent efforts among various
states to change their respective eminent domain statutes in light of
Kelo).
103

See also Carol J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determi-

nation ofPublic Use and Eminent Domain in Economic Development
Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REv. 43, 43 (2006) (discussing
Arkansas's revisions to eminent domain after Kelo); Dale A. Whitman,
Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 MO. L.

REv. 721, 721 (2006) (discussing Missouri's statutory revisions after
Kelo).
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nent domain for economic development projects providing

only an incidental public benefit as the validating public
purpose. 10 4 Kentucky and Tennessee's eminent domain
statutes are similar, in that both statutes define acceptable

public uses justifying eminent domain and limit incidental
private uses of taken land to those that do not result in taking private land solely for incidental private use. 10 5 Kentucky, like Tennessee, declared that the legislative intent
for eminent domain is that it should "be used sparingly"
and only for the benefit of all the citizens within the
state.10 6 One interesting point concerning Kentucky's recent eminent domain revisions is the exemption for land
acquisitions financed by state or federal road funds. 07 The
constitutionality of taking land for a plainly public purpose,
such as a road, would not likely be questioned, but a few
situations exist in which takings for roads and highways
would cause a Kelo type problem for a condemning author18
ity. 0

Georgia
The next state examined is Georgia and its 2006
Landowner's Bill of Rights and Private Property Protection
Act.' 0 9 Georgia, like Tennessee, enacted both specific
procedural changes for eminent domain takings and specific definitions for acceptable public uses justifying eminent
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
106 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007),
with
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp. 2007).
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.675(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
108 One conceivable situation that could trigger this exemption in Kentucky is when a highway project is funded but never completed, and the
property is used later for a private development.
9See 2006 Ga. Laws, Ch. 444 (serving as Georgia's form of comprehensive statutory eminent domain reform).
104

105Compare KY.
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domain. 110 However, Georgia's statutory revisions differ
from Tennessee's in two respects. First, Tennessee's public use definition is more straightforward than Georgia's
definition. Tennessee's definition for public use is contained in one straightforward provision, whereas Georgia's
definition is scattered over several different code provisions.111 In addition, Georgia included both private benefit
and indirect public benefit in the definition of economic
development and summarily stated that "[t]he public benefit of economic development shall not constitute a public
use."'112 Tennessee took the opposite approach and clearly
stated what constitutes an acceptable public use for eminent
domain, albeit negatively, and notwithstanding exceptions. 113
Second, Georgia's definition of blight is more restrictive than Tennessee's because Georgia requires that
two or more of the statutorily enumerated conditions exist
before a property is termed "blighted" for eminent domain
purposes. 114 Tennessee has a more inclusive standard for
blight, where a property meeting just one of the requirements is determined blighted, including the overly broad
"welfare of the community" standard.115 Interestingly, both
states prohibited a finding of blight for eminent domain
purposes solely because a property causes the surrounding
property values to decline because of its aesthetic condition. 116 Arguably, both states have equally strong defini11Oid.
111
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(9)(A) (Supp. 2007), and GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17102(2) (Supp. 2007).
112 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(4), (9)(B) (Supp. 2007).
113 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-102(2) (Supp. 2007).
114 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007) (noting the

conditions for

findings of blight on the property being uninhabitable, abandoned,
environmentally hazardous, or conducive to ill health or disease).
115 TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
116 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (Supp. 2007), with TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (Supp. 2007).
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tions of blight and public use; however, the outcome of
litigation will determine their effectiveness.
Georgia, like Tennessee, takes a comparable position on the legislative intent behind eminent domain because both states declare that eminent domain is solely for
public usages.1 17 Georgia's recent revisions included language allowing a landowner to reclaim his property (i.e.
right of first refusal) or receive additional compensation if
the "property acquired through the power of eminent domain from an owner fails to be put to a public use within
similar provision; however,
five years." 118 Tennessee has a 119
complex.
quite
is
the procedure
In sum, Georgia has enacted equally forceful eminent domain revisions to curb Kelo's negative effects.
Tennessee could easily duplicate some of Georgia's innovative revisions to eminent domain, such as defining blight
based on a specific condition/factor test.
Alabama
Alabama is the last of Tennessee's sister-states that
this paper examines regarding recent eminent domain
changes after Kelo. Alabama's reforms parallel Tennessee's revisions in defining public use and legislative intent
117

Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(a) (Supp. 2007) ("[N]either this

state nor any political subdivision... shall use eminent domain unless
it is for public use.... ."), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-101 (Supp.
2006).
118 See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007). Specifically, the
property is considered put to a public use when a "substantial good
faith effort has been expended.., to put the property to public use,"
regardless of whether the project is completed. While a very worthwhile provision for landowners, the provision is flexible and could
prove to be heavily litigated.
9 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-17-1003 (Supp. 2007) (dealing with the
disposal of land acquired by eminent domain); TENN. CODE ANN. § 122-112 (2005) (dealing with the disposal of surplus interests in real
property held by the state).
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First, Alabama's statutory

revisions prohibited the use of "eminent domain to transfer
private property for 'purposes of private retail, office,
' 121
commercial, industrial, or residential development."
The revisions further prohibited local condemning authorities from using eminent domain to increase tax revenues or
from transferring taken private property to anyone except
purely governmental entities. 122 Thus, Alabama's legislative intent, though not explicitly defined, appears to be that
eminent domain is a tool to be used strictly for the public
welfare. Both Tennessee and Alabama have public use
definitions that are comparable in their effect; however,
Alabama used more explicit language123
to define an acceptadomain.
eminent
under
use
ble public
In addition, Alabama's statutory revisions, like
Tennessee's, permit the taking and transferring of private
property that is termed blighted, under statutory formula124
tions, to private entities under a redevelopment plan.
Alabama's revisions also include a buyback provision for
landowners who lose their property via eminent domain if
the property never materializes into a public use. 125 This
120See Anastasia C. Sheffier-Wood, Where Do We Go from Here?

States Revise Eminent Domain Legislation in Response to Kelo, 79

L. REv. 617, 631-32 (2006) (evaluating Alabama's changes to
its eminent domain laws). Compare ALA. CODE §§ 18-1B-1-2 (LexisNexis 2006), with TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-17-101-102 (Supp. 2006)
(determining legislative purpose and defining public use for eminent
domain).
121
See Sheffler-Wood, supra note 120, at 631.
TEMP.

122id.

123Compare ALA.

CODE § 18-1B-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN.
CODE
ANN.
§
29-17-102
(Supp. 2007).
124
See ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c) (LexisNexis 2007). Compare ALA.

§ 29-17102 (Supp. 2007).
125
Compare ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that
the right of first refusal in the buyback provision goes to the landowner
whom the condemning authority acquired the property from via eminent domain), with GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-2(c)(1) (Supp. 2007) (statCODE § 18-IB-2 (LexisNexis 2007), with TENN. CODE ANN.
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provision is similar to Georgia's right of first refusal and
Tennessee's buyback provisions; however, Alabama does
not appear
have a time limitation on this buyback provi12 6
sion.
In sum, Alabama, like Tennessee, appears to have
revised its eminent domain law to prevent a Kelo-type
situation from occurring, but testing the effectiveness of the
revisions will occur only through future eminent domain
litigation, as is the case in every other state currently revising its eminent domain statutes.
Conclusion
Aside from the critical look at Kelo and the comparison of eminent domain revisions between Tennessee and
its sister states, the recent revisions to Tennessee's eminent
domain law yield several conclusions. First, adding specific definitions for public use, blight, and eminent domain
afford Tennessee landowners some certainty for understanding what purposes the government can take their land
under the power of eminent domain. Until recently, local
governments could determine what constituted a valid
public purpose for taking land under eminent domain sua
sponte.127 The addition of a quasi-specific public use definition should aid both condemning authorities and landowners in determining when eminent domain takings are
appropriate and prevent the possibility of another Kelo
occurrence. The criticism is that the public use definition is
still sufficiently vague and unascertainable, thereby affording the government flexibility in taking property in many
ing that the former landowner can apply to condemning authority to
regain property taken by eminent domain if property is not put to a
public use within five years of its taking).
6 ALA. CODE § 18-1B-2(b) (LexisNexis 2007).
127 See Griswold, supra note 73, at 16 (noting that prior to the
2006
revisions, "counties could use eminent domain 'for any county purpose' deemed appropriate).
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cases. This flexibility in takings could be shown when an
intended public use eventually yields to an "incidental"
private use after the taking or when an economic redevelopment plan uses eminent domain and private development to achieve some indirect public use essentially
sanctioned by the statute.
Second, the revision of the "quick-take" procedure
affords a greater degree of fairness to landowners and condemning authorities alike. By increasing the notice of a
proposed taking to thirty days, both sides have a better
opportunity to evaluate the facts and handle the dispute in a
mutually beneficial manner. This broadened time frame
will hopefully alleviate litigation and encourage settlements
of takings cases outside of court. 128
Finally, the eminent domain revisions are far from
complete. Changes will likely be forthcoming to the eminent domain laws in the future, as time passes and circumstances change with litigation. Overall, the recent changes
enacted by Tennessee to its eminent domain law in 2006
have likely offset any potential adverse effect created by
the Kelo decision, ifjust by the simple fact that the changes
to the law have put the electorate on notice that eminent
domain is regarded for strictly public purposes.
The recent changes to our eminent domain law
would help protect our hypothetical grandmother, introduced at the beginning of this paper, and prevent her land
from becoming another Kelo type taking. These changes
represent progress towards a balance between the government's need and right to take private land for public use
and a landowner's right to enjoy property without the threat
of unwarranted government seizure.
In this author's experience with eminent domain cases, many condermnation actions are eventually settled out of court, but this increase
notice period of thirty days will hopefully facilitate a greater number of
settlements. Many landowners, when confronted with losing their
property, often become upset easily or become irrational if forced into a
quick decision on compensation or other matters related to the taking.
128
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OPINION PIECE

FACT-BASED DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH
Lewis L. Laska*

"Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our
wishes, our inclinations,or the dictates of our passions,
they cannot alter the state offacts and evidence: nor is the
law less stable than thefact" '

I.

What is Fact-Based Death Penalty Research?

The goal of fact-based death penalty research is,
simply put, to capture and document as many facts surrounding legal executions as possible, organize them in a
clear and logical manner, and present them without bias,
cant, or sentiment. This compilation of facts is then made
available for an analysis of whether patterns appear suggesting which facts were and possibly still remain the lead* Member of the Nashville Bar; Professor of Business Law, College of
Business, Tennessee State University; B.S., Belmont College, 1969;
J.D., Vanderbilt Law School, 1973; M.B.A., University of Tennessee at
Nashville, 1973; Ph.D., George Peabody College, 1978.
1 John Adams, Defense of the British Soldiers in the Boston Massacre
Trials (Dec. 3, 1770). John Adams' famous defense of the soldiers
charged in the Boston Massacre resulted in the acquittal of the officer
in charge. 3 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, FROM THE DISCOVERY OF THE CONTINENT 390 (D. Appleton

and Co. 1896) (1882). It could not be shown that the officer, rather
than some other person, had told the soldiers to fire. Id. The jury
returned manslaughter convictions on two of the eight soldiers who
fired on the rabble. Id. at 391. The jury "acquitted the other six;
choosing that five guilty should escape rather than one innocent be

convicted." Id.
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ing factors influencing legal death. The focus of fact-based
research is clear and orderly facts. Indeed, publications
that grow out of fact-based death penalty research document executions in chronological order, and each entry
includes the executed person's name, age, gender, race, a
detailed account in narrative form of the crime for which
the accused was sentenced to death, and information on the
place and method of execution. Regardless of the legal
issue, the first place to begin death penalty research is with
a list of those known to have suffered irrevocable punishment.
II.

The History of Fact-Based Death Penalty Research

Like many other forms of social science research,
fact-based death penalty research had an unlikely origin, an
Alabama gentleman by the name of M. Watt Espy. The
story is well known. In 1970, Espy, an unalterable abolitionist of the death penalty, undertook the solitary task of
attempting to capture information about all legal executions
in the United States. By speaking to county clerks and
librarians and referencing newspapers, official sources, and
even "true crime" magazines, 2 Espy captured information
regarding well over 15,000 executions that were carried out
in the United States from 1608 to 2002. 3

2 The

best quality "true crime" magazines were published by Bemarr

McFadden in the 1920s and 1930s. Bemarr McFadden (1868-1955),
"The Father of Physical Culture," http://www.bemarrmacfadden.com/

(follow "A Publishing Empire") (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). These
included, among others, True Detective and MasterDetective. Id.
3 M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Smykla, Executions in the United States,
1608-2002: The Espy File, app. B (Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research 2004) availableat

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/08451.xml (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008); see also M. Watt Espy, American Gothic, in A
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The famous Espy inventory has spawned several
books addressing America's death penalty including the
works of Daniel Allen Hearn. Hearn steadfastly refuses to
state publicly his view of capital punishment. Rather, he is
a death penalty historian, patiently gathering facts and
declining to offer premature conclusions. Hearn's first
book was entitled Legal Executions in New York State: A
Comprehensive Reference, 1639-1963 and appeared in
1997. 4 Hearn has since published two more books in the
same fact-based model, Legal Executions in New Jersey: A
Comprehensive Registry, 1691-19635 and Legal Executions
in New England:A Comprehensive Reference, 1623-1960.6
One truth, largely unknown by those who acknowledge the value of the Espy list, is that numerous additions
were made to the list through the assistance of Hearn.7 In
particular, Hearn captured and contributed additional facts
from newspaper accounts-most notably The New York
Herald--"true crime" magazines, and local government
records. 8 Specifically, Hearn read microfilm of Memphis
newspapers dating from 1866 to 1876 in order to capture
information about executions in Tennessee, Mississippi,
and Arkansas. 9 Even now, Hearn continues to expand on
the Espy list, and he plans to publish an updated list of
legal executions in the United States since 1866.10 Hearn
urges caution in using unrefined data in the Espy list bePUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT AGAINST

THE DEATH PENALTY,

47-53 (Ian Gray & Moria Stanley eds., 1989).

4 DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW YORK
STATE:

A

COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE, 1639-1963 (1997).
'DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: A COMPREHENSIVE REGISTRY, 1691-1963 (2005).
6 DANIEL ALLEN HEARN, LEGAL EXECUTIONS IN NEW ENGLAND: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE,

7 Interview

1623-1960 (1999).

with Daniel Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12,

2007).
8Id.
9
1°

Id.
Id.
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cause it contains numerous omissions.1 1 For example, the
Espy list contains approximately 312 entries for Maryland. 12 Hearn, presently writing a comprehensive reference on Maryland's executions, has located over 755.
III.

What Is the Value of Fact-Based Death Penalty
Research?

Death penalty commentators often speak about the
random nature of the death penalty. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty after
determining that Georgia's death penalty statute afforded
sentencing jurors unguided discretion which resulted in the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 14
It was only after passing legislative standards, in the form
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances aimed at eliminating unbridled discretion, that states were again allowed to sentence defendants to death. 15
Fact-based death penalty research questions the
theory that the death penalty is or has ever been imposed
randomly; it suggests, rather, that there may be untraditional macro-patterns to explain legal death that simply cannot
be seen without a more complete nation-wide compilation
of executions. Fact-based death penalty research asks, for
example, "What patterns of jury conduct will be revealed if
all executions in the United States are presented for examination by fair-minded people?" These patterns are akin, for
11Id.
12 See

M. Watt Espy & John Ortiz Srykla, Executions in the United

States, 1608-2002: The Espy File, app. B (Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research 2004) availableat
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/0845 1.xml (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
13 Interview with Daniel Allen Hearn, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct.
12,

2007).
14 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1972).
15 Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
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example, to the discovery of large-scale pre-Columbian
impossible to see
civilizations in South America-almost
16
close up, but evident from the air?
Fact-based death penalty research has the potential
to address more narrow issues of law as well. It might, for
example, offer insights into one of the most intractable
injustices encountered during death penalty trials, misidentification based on eyewitness testimony. 17 A basic rule of
evidence holds that eyewitness testimony holds the greatest
reliability. However, in the United States between 1989
and 2003, at least 219 defendants were exonerated in part
on the basis of at least one eyewitness misidentification. 18
Could fact-based death penalty research reveal the fact
patterns within which misidentification is most likely to
occur?
IV.

What Are the Bounds of Fact-Based Death Penalty Research?

Because Hearn steadfastly refuses to commit the
bounds of his research to any fixed medium, they must be
drawn from him in personal conversations. This is not a
pleasant experience. Hearn, age fifty, has become the alter
ego of M. Watt Espy in many ways: stubborn, sometimes
helpful, always critical, and downright irascible. Without
16 See CHARLES C. MANN,
BEFORE COLUMBUS

1491:

NEW REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS

3-27 (2005).

17 See generally Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriag-

es of Justice in PotentiallyCapital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987) (discussing the modem debate regarding innocent persons
convicted in capital cases). However, various authors have addressed
the issue of factual innocence over the past century. See generally
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932); JUDGE JEROME FRANK &
BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964).
18 Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989

Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, 542 (2005).
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the leavening influence of a wife and children, Hearn practices his science largely alone. Although sometimes distracted by a poker game with friends, most of his free time
is spent capturing information about legal executions in the
United States. Nevertheless, here are the bounds of factbased death penalty research, as this author understands
them.
It seems self-evident that only legal executions are
contemplated within the ambit of fact-based death penalty
research-discussions of extra-legal killings are not included. Extra-legal killings include but are not limited to
the following: those who died by their own hand while
awaiting execution, those who died while attempting to
escape, those who were murdered while incarcerated, or
any execution that was not directly administered by the
state. These deaths were not the result of legal executions.
In the same vein, the fact-based death penalty researcher should always document the fact of the legal execution. Two sources demonstrate that this is, somewhat
surprisingly, a common omission; the authors of both of the
following books fail to confirm whether certain people
sentenced to death were actually executed. The first
source, which documents Tennessee executions, is a notable county history series published in the nineteenth century known as Goodspeeds.19 Goodspeeds, for example,
reported "Nelson, a slave of James Elliott, was indicted for
the murder of David Sellers on November 11, 1845. The
case resulted in a sentence of death on June 8, 1846."2 °
This statement is correct but misleading. Nelson's conviction was overturned by the Tennessee Supreme Court in an
19

HISTORY OF TENNESSEE FROM THE EARLIEST TIME TO THE PRESENT:

SKETCH OF HENDERSON, CHESTER, MCNAIRY, DECATUR, AND HARDIN

COUNTIES 834 (The Southern Historical Press 1978) (1887) available
at http://www.mytennesseegenealogy.com/tn-County/hm.htin (last
visited
Feb. 16, 2008).
20 Id.
at 834.
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important decision 21setting out the rules of admissibility of

dying declarations.
The second source is a book written by Dr. and Mrs.
Phillip Crane, a physician and his wife, who used vacation
time to travel by car to each jail in Tennessee's ninety-five
counties taking pictures of the jails. 22 Included in the picture book were the names of people executed in that county
or sent to Nashville to be executed.23 The Cranes reported
the executions of Eve Martin in Hawkins County in 182024
and Green Turner in Giles County in 1871.25 Neither was
executed. Interestingly, Eve Martin was actually murdered
by two men, Robert Delap and Mitchell Marcum, neither of
whom the Cranes mention. 26 Turner's death 27sentence was
reduced to a twenty-one-year prison sentence.
Confirming that an execution actually occurred is a
difficult task that requires a researcher to exhaust a number
of sources; all available sources must be used to ferret out
facts. Most importantly, every effort must be made to locate state supreme court opinions. Failure to make a good
faith effort to locate all state supreme court opinions is
inexcusable. This includes those affirming a conviction, as
well as those reversing a conviction. Surprisingly, these
opinions often go unaddressed. Quite often, this is because
researchers assume these opinions have all been published.
21

Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543-44 (1847).

22 SOPHIE CRANE & PAUL CRANE, TENNESSEE'S TROUBLED
ROOTS

passim (1979) (summarizing Tennessee county facilities for incarceration).
23 Id.
24

1d. at 41.
1Id. at31.

25

26 State v. Delap, 7 Tenn. 90 (1823) (affirning
Robert Delap's convic-

tion for murder); KNOXVILLE REG. June 19, 1821, at 3 (containing the
confession of Mitchell Marcum).
27 Turner v. State, 50 Tenn. 452 (1871); Journal
of the H.R., 39th Gen.
Ass., 0 Sess., app. Thl. Showing Name and Number of Convicts, at 21
(Tenn. 1875) ("282 Green Turner col Giles Circuit Horse-stealing
October21, 1872 21 years").
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On the contrary, many state supreme court opinions
were handwritten. After all, many courts did not begin
issuing typewritten opinions until the early twentieth century. Consequently, these opinions often prove very difficult to read. However, even the most diligent researcher
may encounter an empty vessel. For at least sixty-three
men condemned to death, the Tennessee Supreme Court,
for example, issued written opinions, but these opinions
cannot be located.28 Startlingly, some of these "missing"
29
opinions were issued as late as the 1940s and 1950s.
If an appeal exists but no written opinion, published
or otherwise, can be located or if the supreme court opinion
contains no recitation of facts, as many do not, the trial
court and appellate court opinions must be consulted. In
addition to these court opinions, a death penalty researcher
should examine court records. Hearn suggests the following research protocol for determining whether an execution
actually occurred: Because many rural counties had no
newspapers until the late nineteenth century, a diligent
researcher must consult the minutes of the local county
court to find entries where that body appropriated money to
build a scaffold for the execution and to pay the sheriff to
actually hang the accused. 30 Finally, fact-based death penalty research may also encompass short accounts known
as "confessions," 31 commutation records, newspaper accounts, and even "true crime" magazines.
28

See Lewis L. Laska, Missing and "Mystery" Supreme Court Opi-

nions, 5 NASHVILLE B.J., June 2005, at 20-21. Even when a newspaper
reports the court announced its decision on a certain day, many decisions from East Tennessee, especially from 1883-1903, cannot be
located. Id. The fact that these opinions are "missing" is a discouraging aspect of fact-based death penalty research in Tennessee.
29
Id

30

Interview with Daniel Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12,

2007).

31 During

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a new form of popu-

lar literature arose, namely, the "confession" of a murderer. These
pamphlets, prepared with the assistance of the condemned, recounted

110

4:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 111

Until the latter part of the twentieth century, most
executions were carried out within a year of the crime.
Hence, newspaper articles from that period are particularly
helpful because they often include an account of the execution as well as the crime. In fact, one of the first national
compilations of executions in the United States was the
Chicago Tribune's Year Book, which was published for
several decades. 32 "True crime" magazines may also be
considered a useful source because many of the articles
were written by the law enforcement officers who worked
on the cases and therefore contain photos and details drawn
from actual records that no longer exist. 33 Scholarly discussions of specific cases, however, should be used for
their factual
content, rather than any argumentative material
34
therein.

the crime details. See THOMAS M. McDADE, ANNALS OF MURDER, A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS ON AMERICAN MURDERS
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1900 (1961) (discussing the genre and

describing 1,126 books and pamphlets); see also, Patterson Smith,
Thomas McDade and the Annals of Murder, AB BOOKMANS' WEEKLY,
Apr. 22, 1996, available at www.patterson-smith.com/mcdadeArt.htm
(discussing the book as a "reference work of towering importance").
32 It should be noted, however, that the Chicago Tribune
inventories are
strikingly incomplete: Death penalty researchers, including Espy and
Heam, have discovered hundreds of legal executions that were not
included in The Chicago Tribune's Year Book. Interview with Daniel
Allen Heam, in Nashville, Tenn. (Oct. 12, 2007). Moreover, many of
the people shown as executed were actually suicides, lynchings, phantom cases, or reprieves at the last minute. Id.
33See generally Bemarr McFadden (1868-1955), "The Father
of Physical Culture," http://www.bemarrmacfadden.com/ (follow "A Publishing Empire") (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
34This author has found only three books devoted to
scholarly discussions of specific Tennessee cases. See generally ETHELRED W. CROZIER, THE WHITE-CAPS: A HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION IN SEVIER
COUNTY 118-132 (1899) (describing the killing of Laura and William
Whaley on December 28, 1896 and the execution of Catlett Tipton and
Pleas Wynn on July 5, 1899); THURMAN SENSING, CHAMP FERGUSON:
CONFEDERATE GUERILLA (1942) (describing the killings Ferguson
committed during the Civil War as proven at his trial in 1865); Do-

111

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

112

Finally, fact-based researchers are scientists, not
storytellers. Language used must be clear and without
viewpoint. For example, a murder is a killing or a shooting, not a slaughter. Perpetrators are not slashers, brutes, or
bloodthirsty maniacs. Police are law enforcement officers,
not conniving men protected by a thin veneer of law. Mental status must be described in the most neutral language
possible. Perpetrators are not moral degenerates or imbeciles, but they may be mentally ill, suffering from schizophrenia, or mentally retarded. Likewise, cases must be
discussed by placing facts first and law second, if at all; the
35
law changes but facts do not.

V.

Conclusion

Replacing death penalty story-telling with factbased research should be a concern of all fair-minded
people researching the death penalty in the United States.
Again, the goal is to capture as many facts as possible within the bounds of fact-based death penalty research, as outlined, and present them clearly, without bias, cant, or
sentiment. In the end, the best story-telling is simply this:
Provide the facts that tell the truth. Facts are truly stubborn
things.

NALD E. SPURLOCK, THE BRASSELL HANGINGS OF PUTNAM COUNTY,
TENNESSEE (1981) (describing the killings of brothers Russell Allison

and John Allison and the execution of brothers Joseph Lewis Brassell
and George Andrew "Teek" Brassell in 1878).
35 Many perpetrators would not forfeit their lives today under "evolving
standards of decency." See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 55 1,
575 (2005) (holding that execution of people under the age of eighteen
is barred by the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded is
barred by the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
603 (1977) (holding that execution for the crime of rape is barred by
the Eighth Amendment).
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NOTE

STRIPPED BARE: STUDENTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS, SCHOOL SEARCHES, AND THE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD
Erin P. Davenport
I.

Introduction

In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School District,' the
Sixth Circuit examined whether the law governing searches
of students, specifically strip searches, was clearly estab-2
lished and deprived school officials of qualified immunity.
The Sixth Circuit first evaluated the strip search's constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. 3 Then, the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether qualified immunity protected
school officials. 4 Beard demonstrates that students' Fourth
Amendment rights receive less protection than teachers'
liability and could result in students shedding "their constitutional rights at the school house gate." 5 With violence
and drug use on the rise in schools, courts consider students' constitutional rights less important than the school's
safety and security. 6 Beard held that the strip search's
scope was unconstitutional because the students' privacy
expectations, the search's intrusive nature, and "the severity of the school system's needs" favored the students-not
' 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005).
2

Id. at 601.

3

Id. at 603.

4 Id.at 606.
5 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)

(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
6 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)
(internal citations omitted); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339

(1985) (internal citations omitted).
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the school. 7 Nonetheless, the teachers received qualified
immunity because the law was not clearly established. 8
This synopsis will show how courts have approached the constitutional issues surrounding school
searches and how students' rights have decreased over time
under the reasonableness standard and qualified immunity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.,9 schools' used various approaches to school
searches.' 0 After T.L.O., courts began to limit students'
Fourth An'endment rights. Today, schools search for
drugs, weapons, and evidence of drug use, and according to
the courts, these searches do not violate students' rights."l
Even if the courts consider some searches unreasonable,
qualified immunity protects teachers from liability because
the law surrounding these searches often is not clearly
established. Thus, school officials can act with impunity
because courts will likely perceive the search as reasonable
or grant school officials qualified immunity for their actions. If this pattern continues, students will retain no constitutional rights within school walls, and this deprivation
of Fourth Amendment rights could extend beyond school
walls into everyday citizens' lives.
II.
Back in the Day... The History of School
Searches and Students' Fourth Amendment Rights
Before 1985, courts in every jurisdiction approached students' Fourth Amendment rights differently. 12
The approaches offered four different levels of protection:
7 Beard, 402
8

F.3d at 604 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65).

Id. at 601.

9 469 U.S. at 325-26 (holding that the Fourth Amendment, excluding

the warrant requirement, applied to schools).
1o See id. at 340.
11See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346-48.
v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (mem.)

12 Bellnier

(internal citation omitted).
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the Fourth Amendment did not apply; the Fourth Amendment applied, but the Exclusionary Rule did not; the Fourth
Amendment did apply, but in loco parentis used the reasonableness standard to evaluate the search; or the Fourth
Amendment fully applied. 13 Although the courts varied on
students' Fourth Amendment rights, the Seventh Circuit
declared that nude searches of children "exceeded the14
'bounds of reason' by two and a half country miles."
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit adopted a balancing test,
which weighed "the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of individual students with the interests of the state and the school
officials in the maintenance of a proper
educational envi15
youth."
today's
educate
to
ronment
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided a watershed
case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 16 which created the "special
needs" doctrine for school searches. 17 The special needs
doctrine allowed for warrantless searches when "a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests
that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard."' 8 If the search fulfilled the two-part test, then it
met the reasonableness standard. 19 The search had to be
"justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 20 The Supreme Court did not decide if "individualized suspicion [was] an essential element of the reasonableness standard" because the Fourth Amendment did

13Id. (internal citations omitted).

Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 1984).
16 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
14

15 Tarter

17

Id.at 351 (Blackman, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).

18
Id.at 341 (majority opinion).
19 1d.
20 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
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not list it as a requirement. 2 1 The Supreme Court believed
that school officials could easily apply a reasonableness
standard.22 The dissent, however, warned that this standard
uncertainty among teachers and adwould cause "greater
23
ministrators.

The courts applied the two-part test to determine the
constitutionality of searches, but some courts clarified the
Supreme Court's test. In one case, the court held that a
student's conduct must create "a reasonable suspicion that a
specific rule or law has been violated and that a search
could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that
violation. 24 Without reasonable suspicion of a violation,
the court cannot deem a search reasonable. 25
The courts also considered the search's reasonableness under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 26 If a
search occurred because of a student's tip, the courts look
at the totality of the circumstances to determine if school
officials need to investigate further before conducting a
search.27 The totality of the circumstances applied to strip
searches because factors, like "age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction," determined if a search's
scope was reasonable. 28 Small sums of money did not
warrant a strip search, and courts considered these searches

Id. at 342 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 343.
23 Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
24 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.); see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted).
25 See Cales, 635 F. Supp. at 457.
21

22

26

Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir.

1991) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (holding that
an informant's tip needs to be evaluated under a totality of the circums-

tances inquiry)).

27 See id. at 888-89.
28 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at

342 (footnote omitted).
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as unreasonable. 29 Without individualized suspicion, strip
searches lacked justification unless a "legitimate safety
concern" existed, and officials "must be investigating allegations of violations of the law or school rules . . . 30
Additionally,
these searches needed to be "minimally intru31
sive."
Courts attempted to limit the use of suspicion-less
searches if the students were not athletes. 32 Because athletes chose to participate in school athletics, they should
"expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." 33 Physical education students, however,
"[do not] willingly subject themselves to this degree of
intrusion." 34 Additionally, a suspicion-less search will not
be considered reasonable in lieu of a possible "suspicionbased search" because the government's needs "will never
be strong enough to outweigh" an individual's privacy
interests. 35 If school officials request the police officers'
presence, or the police officers work at the school, then the
reasonable suspicion standard applies. 36 Otherwise, they
37
must show probable cause.
See Oliver ex rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D.
Ind. 1995) (mern) (referring to the argument in Doe v. Renfrow that a
29

strip search for $4.50 is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
30 Konop ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1201
(D.S.D. 1998) (meni). But see Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515

U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding that student athletes were subject to
suspicion-less drug testing because they had a "decreased expectation
of privacy," the search was relatively unobtrusive, and the severity of
drug use in schools was a serious concern).
Konop, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
32 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; Bell v.
Marseille Elementary Sch.,
160 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887-88 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (mem.).
33 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (internal citations omitted).
34
Bell, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
35
Id. at n.5 (quoting Willis v. Alderson Cnty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d
415,421 (7th Cir. 1998)).
36 Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379
F.3d 358, 372 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Moore,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
3
7 d. at 372-73.
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III.
Qualified Immunity: School Officials' "In Case
of Unreasonable Search-Break Glass" Defense
A school official may claim qualified immunity if
courts deem the search unreasonable. Qualified immunity
"is an affirmative defense," and as state officials, school
officials can invoke it. 38 Before the Supreme Court's deci39 this immunity had objective
sion in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

and subjective elements. 40 The Supreme Court, however,
eliminated the subjective element because the "judicial
inquiry" could disrupt "effective government.' 1 Because
qualified immunity is a question of law, courts must determine if qualified immunity protects the official.42
Qualified immunity requires an examination of "the
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct." 43 If the
courts think, "the law was clearly established," then the
official loses the immunity because a "public official
should know the law governing his conduct." 44 To deter-

mine whether a right is clearly established, courts examine
Supreme Court decisions; its own decisions, as well as
45
other decisions in its circuit; and other circuits' decisions.
Most cases turn on whether a right is clearly established, but "a constitutional or statutory violation" must
occur. 46

Thus, courts must look at the situation and deter-

mine whether "the [official's] conduct violated a constituHarlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)).
38

39
40

d. at

800.

Id. at 815.
41 Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted).

See McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir.
1996) (internal citations omitted).
43 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (footnote omitted).
42

44 Id. at 818-19 (footnote omitted).
45 See McBride, 100 F.3d at 460.
46 Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan County, 118 F.3d 507, 512 (6th
Cir.

1997) (internal citations omitted).
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tional right[.]" 47 If the official violated a right, then the
court considers whether that right was clearly established. 48
A right is clearly established if "a reasonable official would
49
understand that what he is doing violates that right.",
Even if courts have not previously addressed the exact
conduct, an official may lose qualified immunity if "in the
50
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.,
Thus, "officials can still be on notice that their conduct
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. 51
Finally, courts must examine the official's actions
for objective unreasonableness, which can be determined
"from direct holdings, from specific examples described as
prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court employs., 52 This evaluation "requires a careful balancing of.
. the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." 53 Once
these criteria are met, the official loses qualified immunity
and may be liable for the unconstitutional conduct.
IV.

The Beard Strip Search

Beard began with a strip search for stolen money
during a gym class. 54 The acting principal called the police
47

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (internal citations omit-

ted).

48 See id.
49 Id.at

202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)).
0Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
51Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
52Champion, 380

F.3d at 902 (quoting Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d
843,

848 (6th Cir. 2003)).
53Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 173-74 (6th
Cir.
54 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Beard v.Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.

2005).
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and asked three teachers for assistance. 55 The teachers
56
separated the students and searched their backpacks.
During the search, a male teacher made the boys remove
57
their shirts, lower their pants, and lower their underwear.
To avoid gender discrimination, the girls endured a strip
search, which required them to lift their shirts and lower
their pants. 58 The teachers did not 59touch the students, and
the search yielded no stolen money.
The students sued the school, and the school filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity.60 The district court denied the motion on the basis that
the law involving strip searches for missing money was
clearly established. 6 1 The defendants appealed to the Sixth
Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. 62 The
Sixth Circuit held that "the law did not clearly establish that
the searches
were unconstitutional under these circums63
tances."
In this case, the court addressed the issue of whether
the law clearly establishes that suspicion-less strip searches
of students are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. This case demonstrates that school officials have
protection from liability even in an unconstitutional school
search. Therefore, students lack constitutional protections
from a search under the reasonableness standard. The Supreme Court's claim that students "do not shed their consti-

55

id.

56 Id.
57 id.

58 Id.

at 602.

59
Id.
60

at 601-02.

Id. at 601.
61Id. at 602.
62 id.
63 id.
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tutional rights at the school house gate" is practically obsolete in today's schools.64
The Sixth Circuit had to decide if school officials
merited qualified immunity. 65 First, the court examined
whether the searches violated the students' Fourth
Amendment rights under the reasonableness standard.6 6
The Sixth Circuit evaluated whether the search was "justified at its inception" and "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances." 67 The search was "justified at inception,"
but the search's scope was unconstitutional.6 8 The search
occurred in a compulsory gym class, and the students, unlike athletes, did not choose "to be regulated more closely
than the general student population." 69 As such, they merited a greater expectation of privacy than student athletes
did. 70 The search was highly intrusive because the students
disrobed, and the girls' searches, unlike the boys' searches,
occurred with other students present.7 1 Finally, the search
attempted to locate missing money, which courts have
considered to serve "a less weighty governmental interest
than a search undertaken for items that pose a threat to the

64 Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)

(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
65 Beard,
402 F.3d at 603.
66 Id.; accord Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901
6th Cir. 2004).
7New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (internal citation
omitted).
68
Beard 402 F.3d at 604-06.

Id. at 605.
See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662, 664-65
(1995) (holding that suspicion-less drug searches are constitutional
when performed on student athletes).
71 CompareBeard, 402 F.3d at 606 with Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating that a strip
search's intrusive nature can be minimized by conducting them in
private rooms with a minimal number of staff).
69
70
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health or safety of students, such as drugs or weapons. 72
These factors, along with no individualized suspicion or
scope to be unconstitutional
consent, caused the search's 73
Amendment.
Fourth
the
under
Because a constitutional violation occurred, the
Sixth Circuit had to determine if the law was clearly established "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a
broad general proposition." 74 In search of guidance, the
Sixth Circuit examined Supreme Court cases, cases in the
Sixth Circuit, and cases in other circuits. 75 The Sixth Circuit noted that Vernonia76 and T.L.O. 77 articulated basic
search principles. 78 These cases, however, offered school
officials no guidance about what would constitute notice
"that the searches ...

were unreasonable" because the Su-

preme Court's test for reasonableness did not "explain how
the factors should be applied" when school officials encountered these situations. 79 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit
noted, "the reasonableness standard... has left courts later
confronted with the issue either reluctant or unable to define what type of80official conduct would be subject to a...
'
cause of action."
The Sixth Circuit cases do not clarify whether the
law surrounding strip searches was clearly established. The
court granted qualified immunity in two cases because of
individualized suspicion of certain students, but in another
72 Beard, 402 F.3d at 605; accord Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661; Oliver ex

rel. Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. id. 1995)

tmem.).
3

74

Beard, 402 F.3d at 606.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

Beard, 402 F.3d at 606-07; see McBride v. Village of Michiana, 100
F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1996).
7'

515 U.S. 646 (1995).
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Beard, 402 F.3d at 607 (internal citations omitted).
79
76

77
78

id.

80 1d. (quoting

Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881,
886 (6th Cir. 1991)).
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case, the court denied qualified immunity because a rule or
law violation may not have occurred. 81 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit cases yielded
no clear stance on strip searches for
82
officials.
school
Other circuits have established a clear stance on
strip searches, but the Sixth Circuit believes that these cases
do not clearly establish "the unlawfulness of the defendants' actions in this case." 83 The Sixth Circuit only uses
opinions from other circuits if they "point unmistakably to
the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and
[are] so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority
as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that
his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would
be found wanting." 84 Because these cases do not meet this
standard, the Sixth Circuit held that the law was not clearly
established
and granted the school officials qualified im85
munity.
V.

Ramifications of Beard on Future School
Searches and Students' Rights

Beard shows how the reasonableness standard and
qualified immunity has eroded students' rights and granted
school officials enormous leeway in their searches. Initially, students' Fourth Amendment rights varied from school
to school, but after T.L.O., a reasonableness standard governed school searches. 86 The courts have broadened this
standard. Under the reasonableness standard, school officials do not necessarily need individualized suspicion, but
81See Williams, 936 F.2d at 889; Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 984

(6th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted). But see Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch.,
635 F. Supp. 454,458 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (mem.).
82
Beard, 402 F.3d at 608.

83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Williams, 936 F.2d at 885) (alteration in original).
85

Id.

86 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
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individualized suspicion could ensure that school officials
will be entitled qualified immunity. 87 Thanks to the confusion, teachers do not know which searches are constitutional and perform questionable searches as a result. Justice
Brennan's prediction in T.L.O. that the reasonableness
88
standard would cause confusion has come true.
Beard proves that courts need to define the law surrounding school searches more clearly. Otherwise, teachers can act with impunity because either they do not know
the law, or they know that the confusion in the law will
protect them. Because the law in various circuits is in a
state of disarray, students lack protection within school
walls. The added exceptions and qualifications to the reasonableness standard do not aid teachers in understanding
the law; they only create more confusion. Without a clearly established standard for school searches, teachers almost
always merit qualified immunity, and no check or balance
exists to prevent them from trampling on students' rights.
Thus, students' Fourth Amendment rights practically do not
exist because the courts consider the searches reasonable or
qualified immunity exists. Beard is a distress signal to the
courts to reach a consensus on what is and is not constitutional in school searches.
Beard has far-reaching future implications. First,
Beard demonstrates that teachers can conduct unreasonable
and unconstitutional searches with little fear of liability.
The decision allows teachers to see how far they can tread
on students' rights because liability will not result thanks to
qualified immunity. Second, if schools continue to conduct
strip searches, the courts may eventually consider them
reasonable in all situations. For example, the courts may
87

See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995);

see also Williams, 936 F.2d at 889 (stating that the principal's reasonable suspicion that students were concealing drugs provided him with
qualified immunity for his search).
8 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 365. (Brennan, J. concurring in part, dissenting

in part).
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find a school's actions reasonable enough to allow strip
searches in group situations without individualized suspicion. Third, Beard demonstrates that a clearly defined
standard on student searches must exist to prevent students
from "shed[ding] their rights at the school house gate." 89 If
students have no rights in school searches, then the trend
will spread from schools into society at large.
Fourth, this decision demonstrates that schools have
become more concerned with crime prevention and safety
than educating students. Teachers conduct unconstitutional
searches under the guise of protecting students. The courts
deem these searches unconstitutional, but the teachers still
receive qualified immunity for their actions because the
courts believe that today's schools are unsafe. If teachers
must evaluate reasonableness, conduct a search, and prove
that the law was not clearly established, when do they educate students? Teachers spend more time policing students
and defending their actions than educating students. Without education, our government, judicial system, and society
in general will suffer from ignorance.
VI.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Beard demonstrates how students'
Fourth Amendment rights and school searches have come
full circle. Even with the reasonableness standard, a state
of confusion still exists, and qualified immunity protects
teachers from liability. Students receive no benefits from
the reasonableness standard. The courts must reach a consensus on the law in this area, or students will continue to
endure unreasonable searches. If the law continues in its
state of disarray, then students may have no Fourth
Amendment rights in schools because the courts continue
Cales v. Howell Pub. Sch., 635 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(mem.) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Crnmy. Sch. Dist., 393
89

U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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to add exceptions. The courts must set a clear standard on
school searches so that teachers and students can return to
the important tasks of teaching and learning.

128

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

129

129

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

130

Publication of contributionsdoes not signify adoption of the views
expressed therein by the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, its
editors,faculty advisors, or The University of Tennessee.

130

4:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

131

NOTE

A VICTORY IN DEFEAT:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RUMSFELD V. FAIR ON
"DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Jill Shotzberger
I.

Introduction

On March 6, 2006, the United States Supreme Court
decided Rumsfeld v. Forumfor Academic and Institutional
Rights.' In this decision, drafted by Chief Justice John
Roberts, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Congress (1) requiring universities to provide military recruiters with the same access to law school career services
offices that the school would grant to other prospective
employers and (2) withholding federal funding for the en2
tire university if the law school failed to grant this access.
The Supreme Court held that these requirements did not
violate the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech
and freedom of association. 3 Although this case, which
pitted thirty-six prestigious law schools against the Secretary of Defense, failed in its constitutional challenge, it
succeeded in bringing attention to a larger public policy
concern: the United States government's continued implementation of the controversial policy of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell."

1Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., No. 04-1152,
slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter FAIR].
Id. at 6.

2

3 Id.at 20.
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The Solomon Amendment

In 1993, Congress enacted "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
(DADT), a policy that banned openly gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals from serving in the military.4 This provision
codified a fifty-year-old practice that allowed any statement
by a soldier about his or her sexual orientation to anyone at
any time to be reasonable grounds for dismissal from service. 5 Due to the implementation of the DADT policy, law
schools began to marginalize or even disallow military
recruiters on campus. 6 The Association of American Law
Schools (AALS) requires its member schools to adopt a
nondiscrimination policy that includes sexual orientation.
This policy limits the availability of a school's facilities
and resources to those employers that comply with the
AALS statement on equal opportunity employment. 7 Due
to DADT, military recruiters were unable to meet the requirements of AALS's nondiscrimination policy, and they
were denied access or 8were granted limited recruiting
access by AALS schools.
In response to the restricted access for military recruiters, Congress adopted the Solomon Amendment in
1996 as a part of the National Defense Authorization Act. 9
4 10 U.S.C.A.

§ 654 (1993).
Solomon Amendment Information,
www.nalp.org/content/index.php?pid=8 1&printer-friendly-true (last
visited
June 4, 2006) [hereinafter NALP].
6
id.
7E.g. Memorandum from Carl Monk, Association of American Law
Schools, Executive Committee Policy Regarding "Solomon Amendment" (Jan. 24, 2000), www.aals.org/deansmemos/00-2.html (last
visited June 6, 2006).
8 See Remarks at the Georgetown Federalist Society Symposium:
Solomon Amendment: Can Congress Condition Benefits to Colleges
and Universities on Their Willingness to Allow Military Recruiters on
Campus 9 (Oct. 20, 2005) (transcript available at Georgetown Law
Center) [hereinafter Georgetown Symposium].
9 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (1999).
5E.g. NALP,
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This amendment prohibited the allocation of funds from the
Department of Defense to colleges or universities that
barred ROTC and military recruiters from access to campus
or career services. 10 In 1999, the Solomon Amendment
was modified in the Omnibus Appropriations Act to withhold funds from the Departments of Defense, Labor, Health
and Human Services, and Education.ll When the Solomon
Amendment was enacted, if a department of a university
(i.e. the law school) denied access to a military recruiter,
federal funding would be terminated for that department.
The 1999 modification expanded these sanctions by permitting all federal funding to an entire university to be withdrawn if military recruiters were denied access to a single
department within the institution. 12 Congress approved a
final expansion of the Solomon Amendment in 2004 to
clarify and strengthen the policy by stating that military
recruiters must have the same access as other employers
and by increasing the potential penalty for noncompliance
by adding to the list of federal agencies that could deny
funding to the offending schools. 13
Il.

Rumsfeld v. FAIR

After the 2004 revision of the Solomon Amendment, thirty-six law schools, along with other affiliated
groups and individual plaintiffs, united to challenge the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment through a
new organization entitled the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights (FAIR). 14 FAIR asserted that the Solo Id.
I See NALP, supra note 5.
12 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (2006).
13id.
14Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 10-11; see Brief
for the

ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Rumsfeld
v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Brief of

ACL U].
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lomon Amendment violated the First Amendment rights of
free expressive association and free speech15 through compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination.
The U.S. District Court in New Jersey held that
there was no violation of free speech, because the law
schools had adequate opportunity to express their own
opposition to the military policy of DADT while still protecting the government's interest in allowing military recruiters on campus.16 Additionally, the court determined
that requiring military recruiters on campus comported with
the standard set in United States v. O'Brien. 7 0 'Brien
determined that a compelling government interest in maintaining the availability of draft cards outweighs one's right
to noncommunicative conduct.18 With regard to the Solomon Amendment, this precedent allows the government
"[to] regulate conduct even if such regulation entails an
incidental limitation on speech." 19 Furthermore, the district
court held that the expressive conduct of allowing military
recruiters on campus was merely secondary to the primary
economic purpose of supporting the armed forces. 20 According to the district court, the compelling government
interest in raising an army balanced against the law
schools' ability to reject the recruiters, albeit at the cost of
losing their funding, failed to infringe on the constitutional
rights of free speech and free association. 21
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed, determining that it was unconstitutional to force a
law school to choose between First Amendment rights and
15BriefofACLU,supra note

14 at 5; FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 274-75 (D.N.J. 2003).
16See FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.
1
7FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 296 at 314.
18See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-382 (1968) (holding that
burning a draft card is noncormmnicative conduct).
'9FAIR,291 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375).
20

Id. at 308.

21Id at

312.
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22
funding under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The Court also held that the O'Brien analysis did not apply
because the Solomon Amendment explicitly restricted
expressive conduct, making the amendment unconstitutional on alternate grounds. 23 The Court reversed and remanded the decision to the lower court to issue a
preliminary injunction against application of the Solomon
Amendment.24 The Supreme Court granted Certiorari.25

IV.

Statutory v. Constitutional Argument

The first struggle that came to fruition for FAIR and
the parties who opposed the Solomon Amendment concerned their methodology in approaching the Court. Harvard Law professors, along with many of their colleagues,
filed amicus briefs arguing for a statutory, rather than a
constitutional, approach to eliminating the Solomon
Amendment. This challenged the language in the statute
which indicated that recruiters be granted access "at least
equal in quality and scope to the access. .. that is provided
to any other employer." 26 Under this language, the professors argued that AALS members and other schools that
prohibit military recruiters are doing so in compliance with
the Solomon Amendment, because they are treating the
military the same way that they would treat other employers who failed to adhere to the non-discrimination policy. 27
Thus, the schools would not be specifically targeting the
military, but rather, all parties who discriminate. This ar"
23 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3rd Cir. 2004).
1 d. at 243-44.
Id.at 246.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005).
U.S.C.A. § 983(B)(1) (2006).
27 Daniel J. Hemel, Future of Campus Military
RecruitingHangs in the
Balance at High Court, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, Dec. 4, 2005,
www.thecrimson.corn/article.aspx?ref-=510278 (last visited June 8,
2006).
26 10
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gument presents the premise that schools are complying

with the Solomon Amendment as written, but Congress is
still withholding funds until special, 28rather than equal,
treatment is given to military recruiters.

The law schools attempted to sidestep the constitutional
issue by presenting the argument that they could implement
their nondiscrimination policies while giving separate, yet
equal access to military recruiters. Had FAIR only taken a
statutory approach and won, it is conceivable that Congress
might have immediately amended the statute to provide for
special treatment of military recruiters, thereby relaunching the issue into a constitutional debate.29
Although not included in FAIR's brief, the Court
did address this issue in its opinion. The Court determined
that the intent of Congress in enacting the Solomon
Amendment was not in the content of the Amendment, but
rather, the result.30 Therefore, because access is the intended result, when other employers have greater access
than the military, the schools are in violation of the
amendment. The Supreme Court interpreted the statute to
imply that it is not sufficient to treat the military the same
way as other employers who violate the nondiscrimination
policy. 31 The military must be granted the "same access as
those who comply with the policy" in32order to act in accordance with the intention of Congress.
V.

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

The next element of this debate addressed by the
Supreme Court was whether Congress placed an unconsti-

28
29

Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 45.
Hemel, supra note 27.

30 Rumsfeld
31Id. at 8.

v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).

32 id.
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tutional condition on its allocation of funding. 33 In Grove
City College v. Bell, the Court indicated that funding could
be conditioned because universities are not obligated to
accept that funding. 34 This is seen most often, as it was in
Grove City, in Title IX gender discrimination cases. Despite Congress' ability to condition funding, Speiser v.
Randall determined that it is unconstitutional for Congress
to condition funding unless Congress would be able to
directly mandate that action. 35 In this case, if Congress had
the power to directly order that recruiters be permitted on
university campuses, then they could condition the funding.
This gives the Spending Clause of the Constitution, which
determines how Congress may allocate funds, equal
breadth with those powers that can be directly required by
Congress. United States v. American LibraryAssociations
determined that funding cannot be limited if the burden
placed on the accepting group infringes on constitutional
rights. 36 FAIR argued that the Solomon Amendment
placed an unjust burden on speech. The Court disagreed.
The Court determined that it would be constitutional for Congress to directly mandate that military recruiters
be allowed on campus. This mandate is permitted because
the government interest in supporting the military should be
given deference. 37 FAIR's First Amendment challenges are
outweighed by the compelling government interest in sustaining national defense. The Court has used and indicates
it will continue to use the argument of a compelling government interest in national defense in challenges against

33 See id. at 9; see generally Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984).

4See, e.g., Grove City College, 465 U.S. 555 at 575-76.

35 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); see also
George-

town Symposium, supranote 8 at 25-26.
36 See,

e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210
(2003).
31 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).
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the military under Title IX or Title VI. 38 By asserting this
position, the Court shows its commitment to uphold and
give deference to military policies despite the possible

39
discriminatory effect on gender, race, or sexuality.
Therefore, it is inconsequential whether the condition is
attached to funding, because the Court validates the condition as a compelling government interest. 40 If a condition
can be directly mandated, then it can be attached to funding
through the Spending Clause. 4 '

VI.

Speech

The next constitutional question addressed by the
Court was whether the Solomon Amendment violates the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district
court determined that "the inclusion of an unwanted periodic visitor did not significantly affect the law schools' ability
'
to express their particular message or viewpoint. 42
The
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that speech was involved in promoting the recruiters and that this speech
forced colleges to host the military's message, as well as
compelled the schools to sponsor the recruiters through
their resources. 43 The Supreme Court rejected this position.
According to the Court's decision in Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Assn., citizens may challenge compelled private
speech but have no First Amendment right not to fund
government speech. 44
Therefore, there is "no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech as the
representatives of the United States military. ' ' 4 Any
38

id.

39 See Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8 at 27.
40 See id. at 26.
41

FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 3.

42 id.

43

1d. at 10.

44 Johanns. v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
45 id.
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speech expounded by the recruiters is considered government speech. In addition, the Supreme Court held that the
assistance provided to the military recruiters was minimal
and not of a monetary nature; therefore, the subsidy issue
was not pertinent to the outcome of this case. 46
The next speech issue under consideration by the
Court was compelled government speech. The Court held
that cases such as West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard do not govern Rumsfeld
because, despite the fact that there are elements of speech
in disseminating notice of the recruiters' presence on campus, the speech used to comply with the Solomon Amendment does not include a required government pledge or
specific content that the school must endorse. 47 Requiring
schools to include recruiters on event schedules or employment fair flyers does not approach the type of speech
protected by Wooley or Barnette.
Like compelled speech, the type of speech required
by the Solomon Amendment fails to meet the standard set
forth in cases dealing with hosting or accommodating
another group's message. To meet the burden of these
cases, the Solomon Amendment would have to inhibit the
school's own message and force the college or university to
accommodate the military's message instead of their own,
or the conduct would have to be of such an expressive
nature that the message of the school would be compromised by the inclusion of the recruiters. 48 The Court held
46
FAIR,
47

No. 04-1152, slip op. at 11 n.4.

Id. at 11-12. See generally W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624 (1943) (holding that a state law requiring school children to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag was unconstitutional); see
generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding it was
unconstitutional for New Hampshire to require that drivers display
"Live Free or Die" on their license plate).
48 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See generally Hurley
v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that the public accommodation law as applied to a private
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that allowing recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive, because assisting a student in obtaining employment
is not expressive. 49 Furthermore, the message of the school
is not suppressed through this statute. Colleges and universities are free to voice their opposition to DADT or any
other military policy. The colleges may post signs where
the recruiters are located or speak out on the issue without
ramifications under the Solomon Amendment. The Court
rejected the argument that simply by having the recruiters
on campus, the school would be viewed as endorsing the
military's policies. 50 As the Court decided in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
high school students are capable of distinguishing between
speech that a school sponsors and speech that a school
permits; Chief Justice Roberts contended, "Surely students
have not lost that ability by the time they get to law
school. ' 5 1 Since colleges and universities are still free to
express their views on military policies and the message of
the school is in no way compromised by the Solomon
Amendment, the Court determined that there is no infringement on speech.
VII.

Expressive Conduct

Conduct can be recognized as symbolic speech
when its inherently expressive nature merits First Amendment protection.5 2 The Court determined that the conduct
governed by the Solomon Amendment is not inherently
parade can alter the expressive nature of the conduct and violates the
First Amendment protection of choosing one's own message); see
generally Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(holding that you cannot interfere with a speaker's intended message).
41 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15.
50 d. at 10.
51 FAIR, No. 04-1152, slip op. at 15. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
52 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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expressive. 53 Since the message that universities are sending when they exclude military recruiters is unclear without
the accompanying speech, the conduct alone is not expressive.54 The Court held that since explanatory speech is
needed to accompany the conduct, O 'Brien does not govern
the issue.55 Moreover, a minor burden on speech is permissible under O'Brien if the government regulation at
would56
issue promotes a substantial government interest that
policy.
existing
the
without
be more difficult to attain
Raising and supporting a military is a substantial government interest, and the effectiveness of this action is altered
when schools hinder the military's ability to recruit. Although alternative methods for recruiting can be implemented, the Supreme Court has deemed this the
57
responsibility of Congress rather than of the courts. Since
the Solomon Amendment does assist in the effectiveness of
military recruiting and is the chosen method of Congress,
the policy will withstand the challenge under O'Brien and
does not constitute a violation of the First Amendment right
to freedom of speech.58
VIII. Freedom of Association
The First Amendment goes beyond the right of
speech, in that it also protects the freedom of association.
One important recent case on the freedom of expressive
association is Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.59 In Dale, the

53FAIR,
54 Id. at

No. 04-1152, slip op. at 16.
16-17.

55 id.

56
57
58

See id.
Id. at 18.

d.

59 See

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-59 (2000)
(holding that the Boy Scouts were an expressive association in which
the forced inclusion of a homosexual would significantly affect their
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government of New Jersey was forcing the organization to
"accept members it did not desire." 60 Unlike Dale, under
the Solomon Amendment, schools are not compelled to
associate with military recruiters in this fashion; the schools
are simply required to interact with the recruiters for a
limited time and purpose, which fails to inhibit the school's
message. 61 There is neither forced inclusion nor an effect
on the schools' right to expressive association, because
they are still free to convey their disapproval of the military's message. Likewise, according to the Court, there is
no effect on the attractiveness of membership in the univer62
sity simply because of the presence of military recruiters.
Through this analysis, the Court held that there was
no infringement on the First Amendment protections of
freedom of speech, expressive conduct, or association.
There was also no violation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Therefore, the Solomon Amendment is
constitutional and should continue to be upheld.
IX.

Why FAIR Lost the Battle

FAIR and numerous other organizations and legal
scholars disagree with the Supreme Court's decision in
Rumsfeld. The first point of contention is how the Court
treated speech. For FAIR, et al. the definition of speech
may have been more narrowly construed than was expected. Email and written notices, as well as providing the
recruiters with space and access to students, were actions
too broad to be considered as speech by the Court. Renowned constitutional scholar, Erwin Chemerinsky, who
personally filed his own amicus brief, wrote, "Never before

expression. The states interest did not justify the intrusion; therefore, it
violated the organization's First Amendment rights).
"°FAIR,
No. 04-1152, slip op at 19.
61 Id.
62

Id. at 20.
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has the Supreme Court held that the government can compel speech as long as the speaker can disavow the compelled message later." 63 He cited Hurley v. Irish- American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. as illustrating that compelled speech was not excused only because the parade organizers could have expressed their
disapproval of the group. 64 By limiting what is considered
protected speech, the Court diminished the effectiveness of
the FAIR supporters' contentions.
Not only was the argument about the form of
speech curtailed, but other scholars contend that the Court
undervalued the significance of the non-discrimination
message. Non-discrimination, to the extent it is valued by
these universities, is a momentous expression. By denying
recognition of this policy as speech, the Court not only
affected challenges to the Solomon Amendment but many
fear their decision spoke to the new Roberts Court's ap65
proach to equality and discrimination issues.
In addition to altering what was previously acknowledged as speech, this Court also took a new approach
to the nature of freedom of association. For the first time,
freedom of association was limited to those groups with
membership. 66 The Court had previously ruled, "the government cannot compel association in a manner that is
inconsistent with a group's expressive message. 67 Application of the Solomon Amendment to universities forces
association by compelling interaction with military recruiters. It may have been unforeseen by FAIR and its supporters that "interaction" would be construed differently than
63Erwin Chemerinsky, The FirstAmendment and MilitaryRecruiting,
TRIAL, May 2006, at 79.
64Id.
65 See David L. Hudson, Law Schools Told to Allow MilitaryRecrui-

ters, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT, Mar. 10, 2006.
Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
67 I.; see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
66
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"association' thereby negating their freedom of association
claims.
A final misjudgment by FAIR may have been their
choice of challenging the Solomon Amendment, rather than
going to the root of the problem. DADT is bad public
policy and is the origin of the challenges to the Solomon
Amendment. Although DADT conflicts with the schools'
non-discrimination policies, many scholars, even those who
vehemently oppose DADT, thought the First Amendment
contentions against the Solomon Amendment were obscure
at best. With a growing trend on the Court towards strict
textualism, supporters acknowledged that it would be difficult to mold the law schools' concerns into a First Amendment case. 68 On the surface, the statutory challenges were
more substantiated than the constitutional claims, despite
their easy correction by Congress through a minor change
in the language. However, the Court struck these challenges down as well. Notwithstanding, their overwhelming
defeat in this case, FAIR and their supporters still have
other fronts on which they can voice their opposition to the
Solomon Amendment and DADT.
X.

Why Rumsfeld v. FAIR May Be a Turning Point
in a Greater War

The Solomon Amendment is only a symptom of a
greater quandary. If DADT were repealed, law schools
would not need to exclude the military, because there
would be no conflict with the Solomon Amendment.
Rumsfeld v. FAIR could act as a symbolic expression of a
growing majority who oppose the military's discriminatory
policies. Bringing attention to challenges like Rumsfeld
69
promotes messages of equality and the repeal of DADT.
68

Georgetown Symposium, supra note 8.

69 See

SolomonResponse.org Home Page, www.SolomonResponse.org

(last visited June 10, 2006).
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In upholding the Solomon Amendment, the Court endorses
a policy that forces schools to relent on their messages of
non-discrimination. The outcome of Rumsfeld has inspired
others to further scrutinize DADT, the policy on which the
decision was grounded. 70 Even with unanimous defeat in
Rumsfeld, DADT and the Solomon Amendment have been
thrust into the public forum bringing attention to what
many Americans would consider unfair and discriminatory
policies. Once the issue reaches the forefront, new measures can be advanced and considered in defining a viable
strategy to overturn these policies.

Given that the Solomon Amendment and DADT are
statutory, there are two methods to defeat them. The first is
for the courts to deem them unconstitutional. The second is
for Congress to repeal them. 71 Currently, two challenges to
72
DADT await litigation that could eliminate the policy.
Chemerinsky contends that Rumsfeld may have only a
narrow impact as precedent or as a guide to policy because
the longstanding tradition of deference to the military by
the Supreme Court. This continuing deference, coupled
with decisions like Dale and Hurley, which are discriminathe
tory to the gay and lesbian community, may limit
73
Court's application of this case as future precedent.
The second means of eliminating DADT, through
Congressional repeal, is also gaining momentum. As more
attention is brought to the millions of dollars spent to oust
more than 10,000 homosexuals from the military, some
members of Congress are taking action.74 Representative
70 Posting

of Sharon Alexander, Deputy Director of Policy, Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, to American Constitution Society
Blog, www.acsblog.org/guest-bloggers-2672-guest-blogger-losing-thebattle-but-winning-the-war.html (Mar. 9, 2006, 2:15 PM EST) [hereiAlexander].
nafter
71
id.

72 id.

73 Chemerinsky, supra note 63.
74

Alexander, supra note 70.
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Marty Meehan of Massachusetts introduced the Military
Readiness Enhancement Act, which would repeal DADT.75
The bill, which currently has 114 co-sponsors in the House,
is awaiting further discussion in the Military Personnel
Subcommittee. 76 Interested parties are also working on
finding bipartisan co-sponsors in the Senate to introduce
similar legislation. 77 As support grows in Congress, increased attention will be brought to the dangers of discriminatory policies and their effects outside the military in
places like universities.
XI.

Conclusion

Through the above-mentioned legislative and legal
methods, the cause championed by FAIR and its supporters
has not been lost; continued challenges to DADT are underway. As the attack on discriminatory public policies
continues on multiple fronts, Rumsfeld v. FAIR may prove
not to be a setback, but a stepping stone to the abolition of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell."

75 See

Press Release, Representative Marty Meehan, Meehan Introduces Legislation to Repeal Don't Ask, Don't Tell (Mar. 2, 2005),
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ma5_meehan/NR050302DADT.html
(last
76 Seevisited June 8, 2006).
HR 1059, 109th Cong. (2005).
77
Alexander, supra note 70.
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